From t.c. Fri Jul 06 23:35:02 2001
Date: Fri, 06 Jul 2001 22:35:02 -0000


I wish I could say something to boost the amount of participation on
this list, something intelligent, something inspired; but alas, no
such thoughts come into mind. I cannot willfully pull stars out of my
head.

I sometimes feel like a fake on these lists anyway, to be quite
honest. I'd like to claim the title philosopher, but I really haven't
developed any of my thoughts of the universe. In truth, I've been
afraid to hold an opinion for fear of being close minded. I have
discovered that being too open-minded can cause one to be close-
minded, in a sense.

I love to learn, but haven't really had the chance to learn much. I
love to read, but I have yet to finish reading my first hardcore
philosophy book. Sure, I've skimmed, and I've taken classes, but I
don't bear up to my aspirations. I first started studying philosophy
a couple of years ago, but other things keep me away from actually
learning something -- actually meditating on ideas to where even I
have figured out a puzzle of the universe.

I want to major in philosophy. I do. I'm curious about things -- but
even I get burnt out on thinking too much. School has me bogged down -
- and I feel guilty for being this way. I honestly feel that I don't
have what it takes to handle ideas, to argue; an irrational thought,
perhaps. I just wish I had MORE TIME. I have all these books, and it
takes me so long to read a few pages ... is it like that for the rest
of you? Do any of you have the mindpower to read hardcore philosophy
all day, or do you just take on little bites?

I am rambling and I'm sorry. Since I don't have any inspired thoughts
in mind, I'm trying the next best thing -- to show myself, in hopes
of getting to know you and your thoughts. I'm declaring that I have
nothing to offer except an open ear, some searching questions, and
perhaps the unfolding of my own philosophy -- however underdeveloped
it may be. I guess we all have to start somewhere.

Thanks for reading, and hopefully responding,
t.c.




From bubastiss4@aol.com Sat Jul 07 04:46:19 2001
Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2001 23:46:19 EDT

if you want to study philosophy, i think it will eventually come to you...in
the beginning you may struggle, but at some point a light will turn on and it
will become a way of life for you and not just a book with some strange
language and seemingly unrelated thoughts...don't get frustrated....=] hh>
>



we call them dumb animals, and so they are, for they cannot tell us how they
feel, but they do not suffer less because they have no words.

anna sewell





From GMS Sun Jul 08 23:11:37 2001
Date: Sun, 08 Jul 2001 23:11:37 +0100

I hope the length of this message is not off-putting.

On Fri, 06 Jul 2001 22:35:02 -0000, tc wrote:

>I wish I could say something to boost the amount of participation on
>this list, something intelligent, something inspired; but alas, no
>such thoughts come into mind. I cannot willfully pull stars out of my
>head.
The whole point about something being inspired is that it is something
"breathed-in" ("in-spire"), it is not a pulling-out.  Further down you
seem to show that you realize the importance of reading works of
Philosophy, so I know I don't need to labour this point.
(You sound a little like Theaetetus, in Plato's dialogue of that name.
I recommend that dialogue as portraying what philosophic debate should
be like.  It's the one where Socrates likens himself to being a
midwife, trying to get Theaetetus to give birth to an epistemological
theory.)
>
>I sometimes feel like a fake on these lists anyway, to be quite
>honest. I'd like to claim the title philosopher, but I really haven't
>developed any of my thoughts of the universe. In truth, I've been
>afraid to hold an opinion for fear of being close minded. I have
>discovered that being too open-minded can cause one to be close-
>minded, in a sense.
I think honesty is important in philosophy, not honesty in general,
but of a particular kind, let us say intellectual honesty, as opposed
to personal honesty or scholarly honesty.  Having a mathematical
background, I admit to having a vested interest, but I do think that
mathematics is the best discipline for training in this kind of
honesty.  In Mathematics, any one who tries to proceed further in the
development of some idea without properly understanding the stage one
has reached soon falls flat on one's face.  In any other discipline,
including Philosophy, it is easier to give the semblance of
understanding and get further and further out of one's depth without
even realizing it.  (I think I can use no less an authority than Plato
to back me up on the value of Mathematics to Philosophy.)
Whether or not you have a mathematical background, you seem to display
the sort of honesty I am talking about, precisely when, for instance,
you describe yourself as feeling like a fake.  The important thing is
not so much how much you understand, but knowing how much you
understand.
I don't think that it is a matter of being "too" open-minded, but a
difference between claiming to be open-minded and being open-minded.
Merely to express the aspiration to be open-minded, without giving any
consideration as to how you might ensure you are open-minded, suggests
complacency, the very opposite of that to which you would be
purporting to aspire.
If you will forgive a mathematical analogy, in a topological space a
subset of it can be both an open set and a closed set.  Indeed, there
are always, in any topological space, at least two sets which have
this property - the universal set (the set of the whole space) and the
empty set.  Similarly, I would want to say a philosophy must be both
open and closed.  (Of course, in talking this way, 'not closed' is not
seen as the same as 'open' - avoiding closure does not ensure
openness.)
I want to claim (but will not argue it here, so it will appear only as
an opinion in this message) that every philosophy is proposing a
theory of everything, even if it contradicts this statement.  Any
philosophy openly acknowledging it is doing so, is throwing down a
challenge and opening itself up to debate.  How it can survive the cut
and thrust of debate and still be proposing the "same" theory is a
problem, but at least it can be brought to deal with this problem.  A
philosophy which does not acknowledge it is proposing a theory of
everything has the same problem, but cannot recognize it, let alone
deal with it.  (The philosophy concerned fails to be able to reflect
on itself - this does not mean the philosophers engaged in it cannot
reflect on themselves as they do it.)

>I've been afraid to hold an opinion for fear of being close minded.
Whether you hold a particular opinion or not, and whether you are
closed minded or not on some particular issue, are simply true or
false.  If you think that such and such is the case, then the denial
that you held that particular opinion would not make you any the less
closed minded about it, you would simply be being dishonest.
What I think would make more sense for you to say is the following:
'I've been afraid to express an opinion for fear of appearing
(revealing to myself as well as to others) to be closed minded.'
Nevertheless, the fact of expressing an opinion, despite being aware
of the fact (and it is a fact, not a mere possibility) that it will
show you to be closed minded in some way, testifies to your openness
to criticism and debate.
>
>I love to learn, but haven't really had the chance to learn much. I
>love to read, but I have yet to finish reading my first hardcore
>philosophy book. Sure, I've skimmed, and I've taken classes, but I
>don't bear up to my aspirations. I first started studying philosophy
>a couple of years ago, but other things keep me away from actually
>learning something -- actually meditating on ideas to where even I
>have figured out a puzzle of the universe.
You seem to be coming sooner to Philosophy than I did.  I have to
admit I was rather dismissive of Philosophy until after I did my first
degree (in Mathematics).  With hindsight I realize that I often
discussed Philosophy with friends, even at primary school, but it was
never conducted in a serious manner.  At university it was associated
only with shortsighted, "professionalized" kinds of philosophy and
that also put me off.
I think that the first Philosophy book I read was Plato's Republic,
the Jowett translation in a cheap paperback at some railway station, I
think, as something to read on the journey.  I found the opening few
"books" (parts of the book) interesting, but after that I found it
very boring.  (Later I came to understand the reason I had at first
found most of it boring, a reason which is in itself interesting, and
shows the value of commentaries, although I still think it is
important to read the texts directly.)  It now seems a very strange
and inauspicious beginning.
>
>I want to major in philosophy. I do. I'm curious about things -- but
>even I get burnt out on thinking too much. School has me bogged down -
>- and I feel guilty for being this way. I honestly feel that I don't
>have what it takes to handle ideas, to argue; an irrational thought,
>perhaps. I just wish I had MORE TIME. I have all these books, and it
>takes me so long to read a few pages ... is it like that for the rest
>of you? Do any of you have the mindpower to read hardcore philosophy
>all day, or do you just take on little bites?
I am a slow reader myself.  I even went to the trouble to get some
gadget to train myself to read faster, a machine which could be set to
give you just a hundredth of a second to see a few words in a little
window, which you then try to write down.  I'm not sure whether the
training has had a lasting effect.  I used to read and write English
almost as if it were mathematical symbols - turning in half-page
essays when three or four pages were expected.  I hope that you do not
find my English as dense now as it was then.  I have actually found
this an asset in studying one philosopher - Aquinas.  Although he was
able to write good literary Latin when he wanted (even wrote some
hymns) most of his theology/philosophy is in doggerel Latin that even
I can follow.  I find him easier to understand in the Latin than in
the English translation, treating his sentences like equations or
mathematical suppositions, definitions or whatever.  His Latin may be
easy to understand, but I don't envy the translators.  Even Descartes'
Latin is not as concise, although, again, almost every word counts.

I doubt if there is any general rule about reading philosophic works.
They vary so enormously in style, and the way they came to be composed
and have come down to us, that it is unlikely any such rule would not
have exceptions.  Except the rule that you should become acquainted
with the text itself, at least in translation.  (I admit I usually
settle for reading translations - my Latin and Greek are not
particularly good and my German nonexistent apart from a few key
words.  My French is better, but I've never bothered with, say,
reading Sartre in French.  I did try reading Descartes' Discours de la
Methode in the original French, but never pursued it far.)

I spent much of my time reading some of the worst writers in
Philosophy - people like Kant and Hegel and Heidegger.  I can remember
one person claiming that he had read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
from cover to cover, but I seriously doubt the value of doing that.  I
have probably read nearly every passage in it by now, but I have never
read more than twenty or thirty pages or so in sequence.  Often
reading just a paragraph or two seems appropriate.
Some one once said he often read the last few pages of a book first,
and there are many works where that might be a good idea.  A
philosopher might think that putting his or her thesis at the
beginning of the book might put off potential readers, either because
of misunderstandings, which the book itself will endeavour to preempt,
or because of some antipathy, which again the book itself will
endeavour to preempt.  Given that these might be the reasons, one must
prepare oneself to be baffled or annoyed or whatever, and hold back on
these immediate reactions, giving the author the benefit of the doubt.
Looking at the contents pages is often useful, particularly in the
larger, obscurely written works, since if you are only going to read
it in snippets its useful to get an idea of the whole work so that it
is easier later to grasp the significance of those snippets within it.
Don't read philosophic works when you are too tired, or for some other
reason you seem to find your mind is just going round in circles.
Even this rule has an exception.  I once heard Dr Jonathan Miller (a
bit of polymath - surgeon, theatre director, etc.) say that to help
him go to sleep he would open Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind at random
and just read a few paragraphs, not trying to understand it, but just
letting the words just flow on continuously.  I haven't tested this
out myself, but I can see that it might be effective that way.
(By the way, if you are studying Hegel, don't start with the
Phenomenology.  A lot of university courses seem to, as well as people
just wanting to study Hegel out of interest, but I think it's a BIG
mistake.
>
>I am rambling and I'm sorry. Since I don't have any inspired thoughts
>in mind, I'm trying the next best thing -- to show myself, in hopes
>of getting to know you and your thoughts. I'm declaring that I have
>nothing to offer except an open ear, some searching questions, and
>perhaps the unfolding of my own philosophy -- however underdeveloped
>it may be. I guess we all have to start somewhere.
Indeed, we have to start from where we are, and challenge each other
to be consistent, each to his or her own philosophy.  Indeed, if each
of us acknowledges we are endeavouring to expound a theory of
everything, each one of us can be challenged to explain how the
insights of the other can be incorporated into one's own theory.
And you do have a theory, you do have something to offer, even if you
cannot yet articulate it.
>
>Thanks for reading, and hopefully responding,
Thanks for writing, and I hope you like my response, though it is
rather long.
And let me also say:
Thanks for reading, and hopefully responding.


Gerald




From GMS Mon Jul 09 20:49:54 2001
Date: Mon, 09 Jul 2001 20:49:54 +0100

Correction to my previous post.

On Sun, 08 Jul 2001 23:11:37 +0100, I wrote:

>Indeed, we have to start from where we are, and challenge each other
>to be consistent, each to his or her own philosophy.  Indeed, if each
>of us acknowledges we are endeavouring to expound a theory of
>everything, each one of us can be challenged to explain how the
>insights of the other can be incorporated into one's own theory.
This last clause is a self-contradiction as it stands.  The theory is,
by supposition, a theory of everything, and therefore already
encompasses every valid insight.  I want to amend it to the following:
'... each one of us can be challenged to explain how the insights of
the other can be incorporated into the exposition of one's own
theory.'
>And you do have a theory, you do have something to offer, even if you
>cannot yet articulate it.
>>

Gerald




From t.c. Tue Jul 10 04:47:46 2001
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2001 03:47:46 -0000

(You sound a little like Theaetetus, in Plato's dialogue of that name.
I recommend that dialogue as portraying what philosophic debate should
be like.  It's the one where Socrates likens himself to being a
midwife, trying to get Theaetetus to give birth to an epistemological
theory.)

Socrates, the midwife of ideas ... yes, I have yet to come across
that dialogue, but I have come across the analogy in my philosophy
class.

>I think honesty is important in philosophy, not honesty in general,
>but of a particular kind, let us say intellectual honesty, as opposed
>to personal honesty or scholarly honesty.  Having a mathematical
>background, I admit to having a vested interest, but I do think that
>mathematics is the best discipline for training in this kind of
>honesty.  In Mathematics, any one who tries to proceed further in the
>development of some idea without properly understanding the stage one
>has reached soon falls flat on one's face.

Yes ... and math too, is bothering me. I feel like playing Descartes
and just start over from geometry or intermediate algebra, rather
than continuing onto my second year in calculus -- I feel my
foundations are as shaky as sand. But that's beside the point --

>In any other discipline, including Philosophy, it is easier to give
>the semblance of understanding and get further and further out of
>one's depth without even realizing it.

Hrm ... true enough, and what also frightens me.

>(I think I can use no less an authority than Plato to back me up on
>the value of Mathematics to Philosophy.) Whether or not you have a
>mathematical background, you seem to display
>the sort of honesty I am talking about, precisely when, for instance,
>you describe yourself as feeling like a fake.  The important thing is
>not so much how much you understand, but knowing how much you
>understand.

Which is nothing at all, really. And I don't want to be like
Socrates, who wouldn't allow himself to learn anything.


>I don't think that it is a matter of being "too" open-minded, but a
>difference between claiming to be open-minded and being open-minded.
>Merely to express the aspiration to be open-minded, without giving any
>consideration as to how you might ensure you are open-minded, suggests
>complacency, the very opposite of that to which you would be
>purporting to aspire.

I think I'm just realizing that, and that disturbs me.

The problem is this -- how to pick an opinion? It sounds strange, but
when one gets down to it, that's all it really is. Whatever our
emotions are comfortable with -- even logically, because logic gives
us a predictable framework, which ironically checks against
emotions ... that makes us "feel" better. We call this "soundness" of
argument.

Unfortunately, I am also realizing there exists no absolutes; thus I
have to try and define which relative truths work better than others,
and which are in sync with my emotions.

Does that make any sense? I swear, I'm flitting all over the place.


>If you will forgive a mathematical analogy, in a topological space

What is a topological space?

>philosophy openly acknowledging it is doing so, is throwing down a
>challenge and opening itself up to debate.  How it can survive the cut
>and thrust of debate and still be proposing the "same" theory is a
>problem, but at least it can be brought to deal with this problem.

How?

> A philosophy which does not acknowledge it is proposing a theory of
everything has the same problem, but cannot recognize it, let alone
deal with it.  (The philosophy concerned fails to be able to reflect
on itself - this does not mean the philosophers engaged in it cannot
reflect on themselves as they do it.)

I'm a little confused -- how can the philosophy "reflect on itself"?
Do you mean address itself in the actual theory?

>What I think would make more sense for you to say is the following:
>'I've been afraid to express an opinion for fear of appearing
>(revealing to myself as well as to others) to be closed minded.'
>Nevertheless, the fact of expressing an opinion, despite being aware
>of the fact (and it is a fact, not a mere possibility) that it will
>show you to be closed minded in some way, testifies to your openness
>to criticism and debate.

Hrm ... hadn't thought of it like that.


>I am a slow reader myself.  I even went to the trouble to get some
gadget to train myself to read faster, a machine which could be set to
give you just a hundredth of a second to see a few words in a little
window, which you then try to write down.  I'm not sure whether the
training has had a lasting effect.  I used to read and write English
almost as if it were mathematical symbols - turning in half-page
essays when three or four pages were expected.

Yeah, I can empathize -- I have a friend who does the same thing.

>I hope that you do not find my English as dense now as it was then.

No, I don't.

I doubt if there is any general rule about reading philosophic works.
They vary so enormously in style, and the way they came to be composed
and have come down to us, that it is unlikely any such rule would not
have exceptions.  Except the rule that you should become acquainted
with the text itself, at least in translation.  (I admit I usually
settle for reading translations - my Latin and Greek are not
particularly good and my German nonexistent apart from a few key
words.  My French is better, but I've never bothered with, say,
reading Sartre in French.  I did try reading Descartes' Discours de la
Methode in the original French, but never pursued it far.)

I'm going to have to settle for translations, as I have virtually no
training beyond
English.

I spent much of my time reading some of the worst writers in
Philosophy - people like Kant and Hegel and Heidegger. I can remember
one person claiming that he had read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
from cover to cover, but I seriously doubt the value of doing that.

Hrm ... ::glances over at the book lying on desk::

>I have probably read nearly every passage in it by now, but I have
>never
>read more than twenty or thirty pages or so in sequence.  Often
>reading just a paragraph or two seems appropriate.
>Some one once said he often read the last few pages of a book first,
>and there are many works where that might be a good idea.  A
>philosopher might think that putting his or her thesis at the
>beginning of the book might put off potential readers, either because
>of misunderstandings, which the book itself will endeavour to preempt,
>or because of some antipathy, which again the book itself will
>endeavour to preempt.  Given that these might be the reasons, one must
>prepare oneself to be baffled or annoyed or whatever, and hold back on
>these immediate reactions, giving the author the benefit of the doubt.

Okay, I'll keep that in mind.

>Looking at the contents pages is often useful, particularly in the
>larger, obscurely written works, since if you are only going to read
>it in snippets its useful to get an idea of the whole work so that it
>is easier later to grasp the significance of those snippets within it.
>Don't read philosophic works when you are too tired, or for some other
>reason you seem to find your mind is just going round in circles.

Figured that out, too.

>Even this rule has an exception.  I once heard Dr Jonathan Miller (a
>bit of polymath - surgeon, theatre director, etc.) say that to help
>him go to sleep he would open Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind at random
>and just read a few paragraphs, not trying to understand it, but just
>letting the words just flow on continuously.  I haven't tested this
>out myself, but I can see that it might be effective that way.
>(By the way, if you are studying Hegel, don't start with the
>Phenomenology.  A lot of university courses seem to, as well as people
>just wanting to study Hegel out of interest, but I think it's a BIG
>mistake.

Well, the only book I have on him (which I have yet to touch -- see a
pattern?
::grin::) is The Science of Logic which is really thick and also
purported to be
difficult material. But thanks for the warning.

Thanks ever so much (I shall not let length discourage me!)

t.c.



From GMS Fri Aug 10 21:17:06 2001
Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2001 21:17:06 +0100

Apologies about sending this so late.  I composed most of it and then
got distracted for several weeks, and since the group is dead, there
was no reminder.  I think I'll unsubscribe after this, but any one
(including Silk) is welcome to email me.
I am sending a copy by email to t.c. as well, in case he has already
unsubscribed.

On Tue, 10 Jul 2001 03:47:46 -0000, t.c. wrote:

>(You sound a little like Theaetetus, in Plato's dialogue of that name.
>I recommend that dialogue as portraying what philosophic debate should
>be like.  It's the one where Socrates likens himself to being a
>midwife, trying to get Theaetetus to give birth to an epistemological
>theory.)
>
>Socrates, the midwife of ideas ... yes, I have yet to come across
>that dialogue, but I have come across the analogy in my philosophy
>class.
I mentioned the dialogue because of your likeness to the character
Theaetetus in the way you are behaving.  Note that if, like Socrates,
I am to assist you in philosophizing, you will have to consider
yourself as a possible mother, indeed a possible virgin mother.
>

>
>Yes ... and math too, is bothering me. I feel like playing Descartes
>and just start over from geometry or intermediate algebra, rather
>than continuing onto my second year in calculus -- I feel my
>foundations are as shaky as sand. But that's beside the point --
I think you may be missing Descartes' point too, and I don't mean just
mean his archimedean point.  Instead of playing as Descartes played,
you are getting lost within the game he played.
Descartes actually found inspiration for his philosophy in his
discovery that algebra and geometry paralleled one another.  In
setting up a correspondence he transformed both algebra and geometry,
rather as translating back and forth between two languages develops
both languages.  This relates in turn to the way philosophies interact
with one another.

>
>>(I think I can use no less an authority than Plato to back me up on
>>the value of Mathematics to Philosophy.) Whether or not you have a
>>mathematical background, you seem to display
>>the sort of honesty I am talking about, precisely when, for instance,
>>you describe yourself as feeling like a fake.  The important thing is
>>not so much how much you understand, but knowing how much you
>>understand.
>
>Which is nothing at all, really.
You understand nothing?  Perhaps you are not so honest after all.  You
seem to understand most of what I write.
>And I don't want to be like
>Socrates, who wouldn't allow himself to learn anything.
??  What makes you think that?  Quite the contrary, I would have
thought.
>
>
>>I don't think that it is a matter of being "too" open-minded, but a
>>difference between claiming to be open-minded and being open-minded.
>>Merely to express the aspiration to be open-minded, without giving any
>>consideration as to how you might ensure you are open-minded, suggests
>>complacency, the very opposite of that to which you would be
>>purporting to aspire.
>
>I think I'm just realizing that, and that disturbs me.
Better Socrates unhappy, ...
>
>The problem is this -- how to pick an opinion?
Do you not mean 'How to pick an opinion to put forward for
discussion?'  We cannot directly pick what to believe -
rather, a belief feels more like something we discover within us - and
indeed we can deceive ourselves about what we think is true.

>It sounds strange, but
>when one gets down to it, that's all it really is. Whatever our
>emotions are comfortable with -- even logically, because logic gives
>us a predictable framework, which ironically checks against
>emotions ... that makes us "feel" better. We call this "soundness" of
>argument.
You are so like Theaetetus here that I feel I should read the dialogue
again myself, to refresh my memory about how Socrates responds.
Meanwhile, the following is what I can come up with.

That is not necessarily all it really is (an opinion).  Until it has
been substantiated it is indeed only an opinion.  But you cannot be
sure in advance that reasons cannot be found for believing it to be
true.  And if I can pick an opinion which you firmly hold to be true,
you will find that you indeed are convinced that it is more than an
opinion, that there must be reasons for it even if you cannot properly
articulate them.  Furthermore, you will find that, regarding this
opinion, it is absurd to suggest that you believe it because you
derive comfort from it, rather you derive comfort from it because you
believe it.
What example, then, shall I pick?  How about the opinion you have just
expressed?  Until you saw my arguments, did you not firmly hold it to
be true?  You may not have had strong views about the merit of the
argument you followed it with, but you nevertheless were confident
that there was a good argument to justify your opinion, and probably
confident that your argument was on the right lines.
Did you really believe it because you felt comfortable believing it?
I suspect that you actually felt slightly uncomfortable about it, but
its truth (as it seemed to you) nevertheless forced itself upon you -
perhaps you even hoped I would be able to convince you otherwise.

I agree that emotions and reason are inseparable, and indeed integral
to one another - what seems to be a battle between reason and emotion
is rather a battle between one kind of reason-emotion combination
against another.  But reason should be distinguished from a proof
within a formalized logical system.  The latter is a mechanical
manipulation of symbols, better done by a computer than a human being.
But reason, or informal logic, cannot be pre-dictable - its results
cannot be "said before" they are said (they are made "logical" - put
in words "logos").
>
>Unfortunately, I am also realizing there exists no absolutes; thus I
>have to try and define which relative truths work better than others,
>and which are in sync with my emotions.
>
>Does that make any sense? I swear, I'm flitting all over the place.
It has some sense, but it is contradictory.  Are there absolutely no
absolutes?  The way I try to resolve this is to claim that 'absolute'
and 'relative' are opposites, but not mutually exclusive.
>
>
>>If you will forgive a mathematical analogy, in a topological space
>
>What is a topological space?
It is probably the most generalized notion of space that you can have.
A metric space is a set of points with a metric, a distance (a
positive real number) defined for every pair of points, and these
distances between points satisfy what is called the triangular
inequality (thus keeping some of the properties we expect a notion of
distance to have).  A topological space doesn't necessarily even have
a metric (though evey metric space is a topological space), but still
has notions of nearness, continuity, connectivity, boundary,
dimension, convergence, etc..
>
>>philosophy openly acknowledging it is doing so, is throwing down a
>>challenge and opening itself up to debate.  How it can survive the cut
>>and thrust of debate and still be proposing the "same" theory is a
>>problem, but at least it can be brought to deal with this problem.
>
>How?
Ah, if you want to know that, you will have to read a few of my essays
on my web site - it would take too long to explain here.  Let me know
if you are interested.  After all, you did say length was no
deterrent!
>
>> A philosophy which does not acknowledge it is proposing a theory of
>> everything has the same problem, but cannot recognize it, let alone
>> deal with it.  (The philosophy concerned fails to be able to reflect
>> on itself - this does not mean the philosophers engaged in it cannot
>> reflect on themselves as they do it.)
>
>I'm a little confused -- how can the philosophy "reflect on itself"?
>Do you mean address itself in the actual theory?
Yes, a philosophy can refer to itself through the exposition (of the
theory) it is producing.  For most philosophies, the philosophy gets
no nearer to reflecting on itself than to discuss Philosophy as a
whole - ambiguously as both a historical enterprise and a prescriptive
ideal - separately from particular remarks about particular texts
producing (and defining) it.
>

>I'm going to have to settle for translations, as I have virtually no
>training beyond
>English.
It's not necessarily a disadvantage.  I was once told that Germans
found that English translations of Kant's works helped them to
understand Kant.  This is partly a comment on Kant's style, but I
think that even studying someone like, say, Hume, can benefit from
putting up an artificial barrier between oneself and a text, raising a
question mark about what is being meant, rather than taking the
meaning as immediately given.

>> Don't read philosophic works when you are too tired, or for some other
>> reason you seem to find your mind is just going round in circles.
>
>Figured that out, too.
It's easy to forget, however.  The danger is a kind of impatience,
expecting to understand something by rushing headlong into it, instead
of making a strategic retreat to regroup one's forces to attack the
weakest point in the enemy's forces (if you will allow the military
metaphor).
Sometimes the problem is simply not realizing that the writer has
changed the way in which ideas are being presented without sufficient
warning.  This seems to happen surprisingly often in philosophic
works.
>

>(By the way, if you are studying Hegel, don't start with the
>Phenomenology.  A lot of university courses seem to, as well as people
>just wanting to study Hegel out of interest, but I think it's a BIG
>mistake.
>
>Well, the only book I have on him (which I have yet to touch -- see a
>pattern?
>::grin::) is The Science of Logic which is really thick and also
>purported to be
>difficult material. But thanks for the warning.
Nevertheless, the Science of Logic is a better starting point than the
Phenomenology, being more consistent with the overal structure of his
system.  The fact that it presents the first of the three parts of his
system, however, does not mean that it is particularly suited to being
fhe first part to study.  What I wrote about reading the ending of a
philosophic work before the beginning nearly always works well with
Hegel.  And being aware where a snippet belongs within the overal
scheme ALWAYS helps.  It doesn't necessarily belong where Hegel puts
it, because he is often commenting on himself.  And he is particularly
bad in that respect in his introductions, often tying himself in knots
by trying to do the very things he himself claims he should not try to
do at that point.
>
>Thanks ever so much (I shall not let length discourage me!)
Thanks for being interested.


Gerald

From t.c. Sat Aug 18 05:59:53 2001
Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2001 04:59:53 -0000

> >>(You sound a little like Theaetetus, in Plato's dialogue of that
> >>name.
> >>I recommend that dialogue as portraying what philosophic debate
should
> >>be like.  It's the one where Socrates likens himself to being a
> >>midwife, trying to get Theaetetus to give birth to an
> >>epistemological
> >>theory.)
> >
> >Socrates, the midwife of ideas ... yes, I have yet to come across
> >that dialogue, but I have come across the analogy in my philosophy
> >class.
> I mentioned the dialogue because of your likeness to the character
> Theaetetus in the way you are behaving.  Note that if, like
> Socrates,
> I am to assist you in philosophizing, you will have to consider
> yourself as a possible mother, indeed a possible virgin mother.

Hm. Okay. I wish I could go and find that dialogue, as well.

> I think you may be missing Descartes' point too, and I don't mean
> just mean his archimedean point.  Instead of playing as Descartes
> played, you are getting lost within the game he played. Descartes
> actually found inspiration for his philosophy in his discovery that
> algebra and geometry paralleled one another.  In setting up a
> correspondence he transformed both algebra and geometry, rather as
> translating back and forth between two languages develops both
> languages.  This relates in turn to the way philosophies interact
> with one another.

But how can one liken algebra and geometry in this way to the way
philosophies interact with one another?

Actually, I know you're right. It's just that I hate being given some
theorem to memorize and apply. I'm more into math theory. I want to
know where it came from -- and the teaching of it doesn't seem to
progress in the way that math actually progressed. You need calc to
figure out the equations of 3-D geometric figures, but you take
geometry first.

>

> >Which is nothing at all, really.
> You understand nothing?  Perhaps you are not so honest after all.
You seem to understand most of what I write.

Yeah, but that's only a little piece of what knowledge exists in the
world. Logic-wise, one does not call 1% significant. If it's 99%
true, then take it as more of an absolute.

I only understand perhaps 1% or less of the knowledge in existence,
therefore I really don't understand anything at all.

Of course, if you wish to call that 1% something, and say that it is
so because of the vastness of knowledge the world has today...

And I don't want to be like Socrates, who wouldn't allow himself to
learn anything.
> ??  What makes you think that?  Quite the contrary, I would have
> thought.

He (or perhaps, better applied to Plato) would not accept relativism
as truth. He wanted only absolutes. So he ignored, did not take into
account, the importance of relativism, which was advocated strongly
by the pre-Socratics.

> >The problem is this -- how to pick an opinion?
> Do you not mean 'How to pick an opinion to put forward for
> discussion?'  We cannot directly pick what to believe -
> rather, a belief feels more like something we discover within us -
> and indeed we can deceive ourselves about what we think is true.

There's enough relativism in the world to know that even
contradictory theories can be true -- enough evidence proves that. I
can't think of a specific example off the top of my head. So you can
see both (or however many) sides to an argument. So which to choose
then? What you feel is right? Ultimately, it rests on the emotions at
that point...

Or, you just take one side arbitrarily, if you just want to debate.
It doesn't matter if you believe it or not.

The theories of the world are just that -- theories. Everything is so
arbitrary. And because of relativism, a framework can be manipulated
to work for most of the time...

I can't prove logic, because I'd need logic to prove it. Logic in
itself is arbitrary. Based primarily on the premise that the world is
not contradictory. Ha ha. But we use it because our emotions like
that framework...


>
> That is not necessarily all it really is (an opinion).  Until it has
> been substantiated it is indeed only an opinion.  But you cannot be
> sure in advance that reasons cannot be found for believing it to be
> true.  And if I can pick an opinion which you firmly hold to be
> true, you will find that you indeed are convinced that it is more
> than an opinion, that there must be reasons for it even if you cannot
> properly articulate them.  Furthermore, you will find that, regarding
> this opinion, it is absurd to suggest that you believe it because you
> derive comfort from it, rather you derive comfort from it because you
> believe it.

But if we didn't derive comfort from it, we would feel like we're
missing something from it. I know it's a fallacy to hold a philosophy
in order to make us feel comfortable. But we wouldn't settle with
that philosophy in the first place until it was in sync with our
emotions, or perhaps our judgement, if you wish to define it that. In
our decisions, when it comes to certain things, like morality,
perhaps, it comes down to many times whatever "we feel is right".


> What example, then, shall I pick?  How about the opinion you have
just expressed?  Until you saw my arguments, did you not firmly hold
it to be true?  You may not have had strong views about the merit of
the argument you followed it with, but you nevertheless were confident
that there was a good argument to justify your opinion, and probably
confident that your argument was on the right lines.
Did you really believe it because you felt comfortable believing it?
I suspect that you actually felt slightly uncomfortable about it, but
its truth (as it seemed to you) nevertheless forced itself upon you -
perhaps you even hoped I would be able to convince you otherwise.

I put it forth with the greatest uncomfort, actually. Because I feel
like I'm missing something ... I am always waiting to see if I'm
wrong. I don't know. I don't really like what I'm seeing. I don't
like the idea of relativism, but what choice do I have? I can't
find "absolutes" ... does that mean I accept my own philosophy? I
guess so, by its very nature -- by rejecting it (because I don't
really like it emotionally) I am accepting it. Ahhhhhh. I'm so
confused. See, now I feel intuitively that I'm wrong. Help!

>
> I agree that emotions and reason are inseparable, and indeed
> integral
> to one another - what seems to be a battle between reason and
> emotion
> is rather a battle between one kind of reason-emotion combination
> against another.  But reason should be distinguished from a proof
> within a formalized logical system.  The latter is a mechanical
> manipulation of symbols, better done by a computer than a human
> being.
> But reason, or informal logic, cannot be pre-dictable - its results
> cannot be "said before" they are said (they are made "logical" - put
> in words "logos").

I think I agree here. That's what angers me, in a way. We manipulate
reason so that it fits some arbitrary framework (in this case, logic)

Thanks for the explanation of topological space.

> >How?
> Ah, if you want to know that, you will have to read a few of my
essays on my web site - it would take too long to explain here.  Let
me know if you are interested.  After all, you did say length was no
deterrent!

Okay, but I think I'll save it for another day...my brain is sorta
fried...

> >Don't read philosophic works when you are too tired, or for some
other
> >reason you seem to find your mind is just going round in circles.
> >
> >Figured that out, too.
> It's easy to forget, however.  The danger is a kind of impatience,
> expecting to understand something by rushing headlong into it,
> instead of making a strategic retreat to regroup one's forces to
> attack the weakest point in the enemy's forces (if you will allow the
> military metaphor). Sometimes the problem is simply not realizing
> that the writer has changed the way in which ideas are being
> presented without sufficient warning.  This seems to happen
> surprisingly often in philosophic works.

Yeah, I feel impatient, but I realize there's nothing I can DO about
it. That causes more frustration. Of course, sometimes I need to just
stop pondering whether I should get up and go read a few pages and
just go DO it...

> What I wrote about reading the ending of a
> philosophic work before the beginning nearly always works well with
> Hegel.  And being aware where a snippet belongs within the overal
> scheme ALWAYS helps.  It doesn't necessarily belong where Hegel puts
> it, because he is often commenting on himself.  And he is
> particularly bad in that respect in his introductions, often tying
> himself in knots by trying to do the very things he himself claims he
> should not try to do at that point.

Hey, thanks! I'll keep that definitely in mind. It'll save hours of
frustration, I think.

t.c.





From GMS Sat Sep 01 15:52:59 2001

t.c.

On Sat, 18 Aug 2001 05:00:13 -0000, you wrote:


>
[I wrote:]
>> I think you may be missing Descartes' point too, and I don't mean
>>just mean his archimedean point.  Instead of playing as Descartes
>>played, you are getting lost within the game he played. Descartes
>>actually found inspiration for his philosophy in his discovery that
>>algebra and geometry paralleled one another.  In setting up a
>>correspondence he transformed both algebra and geometry, rather as
>>translating back and forth between two languages develops both
>>languages.  This relates in turn to the way philosophies interact
>>with one another.
>
[You replied:]
>But how can one liken algebra and geometry in this way to the way
>philosophies interact with one another?
That was my suggestion - I don't think Descartes actually suggests
that anywhere.  Rather, Descartes hoped to unify all branches of
knowledge in an analogous way to the way he brought algebra and
geometry together.  However, the analogy does not necessarily mean the
two sides being related to one another merge into one another - I'm
not even sure if one can say that algebra and geometry have merged
into one another, and when it is a question of relating two
disciplines together this would seem to be rarely the case.  What
relates them to each other, connects them, often brings out more
clearly the difference between them.

A concept which seems to have great explanatory power in one
discipline naturally tends to "overflow" into other disciplines, i.e.
suggest extensions into areas where it was never intended to be
explanatory.  These other disciplines remain other disciplines, not by
setting up artificial barriers to this, but by recognizing that the
concept will be transformed to adapt to a new context, and the most
appropriate or fruitful way will not necessarily be immediately
obvious.

As for my suggestion, if you are not persuaded by the analogy, I will
have to let the matter drop, at least for now.  It is more complicated
within Philosophy, as you would expect from an analogy about the
analogical process itself.
>
>Actually, I know you're right.
It's nice that you know I'm right, but I don't know, or at least I
don't know what you know I'm right about.
>It's just that I hate being given some
>theorem to memorize and apply.
I suspect that you are referring to being expected to mechanically
churn out some theorem in an exam.  As with any subject matter, you
should try to be interested for its own sake, rather than just for
passing exams.
>I'm more into math theory.
You use of the phrase 'math theory' seems a little odd.  You seem to
mean something like 'history of maths', and so I will take in my
remarks below.
>I want to
>know where it came from -- and the teaching of it doesn't seem to
>progress in the way that math actually progressed. You need calc to
>figure out the equations of 3-D geometric figures, but you take
>geometry first.
The history of maths is very interesting, particularly the early
history.  The history of the notion of counting, or even of a number
such as 2, makes one realize just how much we take such notions for
granted, when their original development must have been very tricky
and slow.  However, you don't need to know this history in order to be
able to count, quite the contrary.
I like to draw an analogy between the order of learning maths and the
order of development of a human embryo.  The embryo develops in a way
which is similar to evolution of the human species.  However, this
development differs in two important respects (other than speed).
Firstly, divergence is part of the history of that evolution, but no
divergent branch is represented in the development of the embryo.
Secondly, features may evolve by appearing later in an individual's
life cycle than they used to.
Likewise the order in which maths is learnt should not slavishly
follow the order in which maths actually developed in history.  In
particular, I don't think one need take geometry as far as Euclid did
before learning any algebra.
>

>
>>
>
>> >Which is nothing at all, really.
>> You understand nothing?  Perhaps you are not so honest after all.
>>You seem to understand most of what I write.
>
>Yeah, but that's only a little piece of what knowledge exists in the
>world. Logic-wise, one does not call 1% significant. If it's 99%
>true, then take it as more of an absolute.
What you mean is, it was hyperbole on your part to say that you
understood nothing.  Whatever you mean by 'logic-wise', 1% is
significant or not according to context.  I'm only .00000002% of the
world's population, but I still think I'm significant, at least to
myself.
How can you take something as more or less of an absolute?  .00000002%
of the world's population is absolute in its significance to me.
(Note that significance is always relative in the sense that it
depends on to whom or to what project it is significant.)
>
>I only understand perhaps 1% or less of the knowledge in existence,
>therefore I really don't understand anything at all.
How can knowledge be quantified?  Supposing that it can be quantified,
how can you be so sure of the total quantity there is to be known?
Can you even be sure it is not infinite?

Being able to understand most of what I have written in this
discussion already may seem trivial in the grand scheme of things, as
you see it.  But it is not trivial in proportion to the understanding
you require to continue participating, in a rational way, in this
discussion.
>
>Of course, if you wish to call that 1% something, and say that it is
>so because of the vastness of knowledge the world has today...
I have no problem claiming that you have some understanding and
knowledge - I can do it without your consent.  But your reluctance to
admit it is a problem for you.  If we are to make any progress in this
discussion you must be prepared to look at what you do think you know,
however much you fear it will crumble away like a vampire exposed to
the light of day.

The rest of your last post was about sophism and relativism.  Before
discussing your points individually I first have to charge you to
declare honestly whether you believe that rational argument and debate
are possible.  If you cannot admit that it is possible, the arguments
against its possibility being so persuasive, then any efforts to
engage you in rational debate are being wasted, and I leave you to
your fate.  If, on the other hand, you can still admit that it is
possible, although you cannot yet see what is wrong with the arguments
against its possibility, then read on.  The rest of this message will assume that
you will make this admission.

As you made it clear in your last post, and we are in agreement on
this, relativism has a direct impact on the possibility of genuine
(i.e. rational) debate between us.   Your words show this, such as in
claiming that Socrates wouldn't allow himself to learn anything, and
'Everything is arbitrary'.  Indeed you effectively deny the
possibility of rational debate, and therefore I have to insist that
you make clear how serious you are in this denial.

I will not try to argue against relativism by claiming that it
directly contradicts itself, although I will point out some
contradictions in your articulation of it.  Relativism is rather like
a notice which reads 'Please ignore this notice'.  It uses a kind of
argument which can be presented without formal contradiction, but if
the conclusion is true, then it follows that the argument is worthless
(as all rational argument is worthless).

>
>>>And I don't want to be like Socrates, who wouldn't allow himself to
>>>learn anything.
>> ??  What makes you think that?  Quite the contrary, I would have
>> thought.
>
>He (or perhaps, better applied to Plato) would not accept relativism
>as truth. He wanted only absolutes. So he ignored, did not take into
>account, the importance of relativism, which was advocated strongly
>by the pre-Socratics.
Socrates was certainly concerned to oppose sophism, what might now be
called moral relativism.  Probably Plato broadened it out a little
toward the metaphysical or epistemological, where the logic is
similar.  But on this issue Plato probably remained most faithful to
Socrates.

Strictly speaking, you do not make a contradiction in the above
paragraph, but I suspect there is one lurking there in that you are
probably aware that Socrates and Plato spent a lot of their time
trying to oppose sophism (admittedly hinted at rather than explicit
in 'would not accept'), and this contradicts the claim that either of
them ignored the importance of relativism.
Plato (and almost certainly Socrates too) did not merely reject
relativism and oppose it politically, he argued against it
philosophically.  You do not even hint at the existence of such
arguments.  I recommend the dialogue 'Protagoras'.  (Protagoras was
one of the greatest sophists - he coined the slogan 'Man is the
measure of all things'.  Plato tries to modify this to 'The wise man
is the measure of all things.')
I don't see how 'He wanted only absolutes' implies 'He would not allow
himself to learn anything'.  I suspect you are confusing 'wanting
absolutes' with presuming you have the absolute already, as would seem
to be implied in accepting relativism as truth.  If you seriously
believe rational debate is impossible, then you are certainly unable
to learn anything philosophically.
>
>> >The problem is this -- how to pick an opinion?
>> Do you not mean 'How to pick an opinion to put forward for
>> discussion?'  We cannot directly pick what to believe -
>> rather, a belief feels more like something we discover within us -
>>and indeed we can deceive ourselves about what we think is true.
>
>There's enough relativism in the world to know that even
>contradictory theories can be true -- enough evidence proves that. I
>can't think of a specific example off the top of my head. So you can
>see both (or however many) sides to an argument. So which to choose
>then? What you feel is right? Ultimately, it rests on the emotions at
>that point...
Here you illustrate how eclecticism and relativism are closely
related.  Eclecticism and nihilism are like two extreme ends in the
spectrum of relativism.
The existence of a contradiction within a theory or between theories
is not a fatal flaw in Philosophy so long as it is removable.  A
contradiction involves bringing things together by interpreting them
into the same language.  Thus contradictions can always be avoided by
twisting interpretations and introducing subltle distinctions.  But we
are not free to interpret or to introduce distinctions however we may
please.  Thus the absence of a formal contradiction may disguise a
very serious conflict of ideas, while its presence may be due largely
to carelessness.
Kant and Hegel argue that reason is always falling into contradiction,
and they are concerned to find ways to remove the contradictions which
inevitably arise.  Hegel even tries to make contradiction integral to
his theory, but here I think he goes astray.  While accepting that the
exposition inevitably has tensions within what is already written of
it at any point in time, I nevertheless believe it should be able to
argue that those tensions must be ultimately reconcilable.  I would
even go so far as to say that certain particular tensions are always
there, and yet still be able to argue that these tensions are
ultimately reconcileable.

To see any philosophic issue as just a matter of choosing sides
presupposes that neither side can learn anything through the debate
itself.
>
>Or, you just take one side arbitrarily, if you just want to debate.
>It doesn't matter if you believe it or not.
One may adopt a position for the sake of an argument.  One must seek
as much truth as possible on every side of a debate (even while
participating - which means while being on some one side).  But if it
does not matter to you what you or I believe, why debate anything?
>
>The theories of the world are just that -- theories. Everything is so
>arbitrary. And because of relativism, a framework can be manipulated
>to work for most of the time...
If you accept relativism as truth, then everything is as you say, but
then you are in no position to argue rationally for relativism - your
own adherence to it is, as relativism maintains, arbitrary.
>
>I can't prove logic, because I'd need logic to prove it. Logic in
>itself is arbitrary. Based primarily on the premise that the world is
>not contradictory. Ha ha. But we use it because our emotions like
>that framework...
Likewise you cannot argue that logic (and here 'logic' is to be taken
in the wider, non-formal sense) is arbitrary.  You can only assert it
as an opinion.

When I find myself thinking contradictory things about the world I
deduce that I have made some kind of mistake.  Are you saying that I
like making mistakes?
The suggestion that the world may be contradictory, on the other hand,
is clearly a case of believing what one wants to believe, and a
perverse justification of that.  (Perverse because it is a
justification for having no justification.)

Is there a difference between my emotions liking something, and my
liking something?
>
>
>>
>> That is not necessarily all it really is (an opinion).  Until it has
>> been substantiated it is indeed only an opinion.  But you cannot be
>> sure in advance that reasons cannot be found for believing it to be
>> true.  And if I can pick an opinion which you firmly hold to be
>>true, you will find that you indeed are convinced that it is more
>>than an opinion, that there must be reasons for it even if you cannot
>>properly articulate them.  Furthermore, you will find that, regarding
>>this opinion, it is absurd to suggest that you believe it because you
>>derive comfort from it, rather you derive comfort from it because you
>>believe it.
>
>But if we didn't derive comfort from it, we would feel like we're
>missing something from it. I know it's a fallacy to hold a philosophy
>in order to make us feel comfortable. But we wouldn't settle with
>that philosophy in the first place until it was in sync with our
>emotions, or perhaps our judgement, if you wish to define it that. In
>our decisions, when it comes to certain things, like morality,
>perhaps, it comes down to many times whatever "we feel is right".
I certainly agree that emotions are important.  There is an emotional
aspect to all our thinking, however abstract.  A part of oneself lives
in one's words, and when those words are attacked, one is hurt, and
there are even cases of people dying as a result.  This is why it can
be so difficult to admit one may be wrong.  Are you attracted to
relativism for fear of getting hurt?  Better to have loved and lost,
than never to have loved at all.
It's not that one believes something because one is emotionally
attached to the belief, rather one's attachment *is* the belief, and
there is an emotional dimension to any attachment, although it is
often hidden until under threat - e.g.  I am not normally aware of my
emotional attachment to my eyes, but the very thought of some one
poking my eyes out disturbs me, even though I believe I would feel no
physical pain.

However, the importance of emotion in no way displaces the importance
of reason - ideally they should be in harmony, each guiding the other,
but not "in sync" if that means that they are merged into being the
same sort of thing.  Moreover, pointing out an emotional basis does
not support relativism as you suppose.  I should only do what I feel
is right, just as I should only maintain what I believe is true.  But
just as I may come to recognize that my belief was false by acquiring
knowledge, so I can come to feel that what I did was wrong by
acquiring good habits.
>
>
[I wrote:]
>> What example, then, shall I pick?  How about the opinion you have
>>just expressed?  Until you saw my arguments, did you not firmly hold
>>it to be true?  You may not have had strong views about the merit of
>>the argument you followed it with, but you nevertheless were confident
>>that there was a good argument to justify your opinion, and probably
>>confident that your argument was on the right lines.
>>Did you really believe it because you felt comfortable believing it?
>>I suspect that you actually felt slightly uncomfortable about it, but
>>its truth (as it seemed to you) nevertheless forced itself upon you -
>>perhaps you even hoped I would be able to convince you otherwise.
>
[You replied:]
>I put it forth with the greatest uncomfort, actually. Because I feel
>like I'm missing something ... I am always waiting to see if I'm
>wrong. I don't know. I don't really like what I'm seeing. I don't
>like the idea of relativism, but what choice do I have? I can't
>find "absolutes" ... does that mean I accept my own philosophy? I
>guess so, by its very nature -- by rejecting it (because I don't
>really like it emotionally) I am accepting it. Ahhhhhh. I'm so
>confused. See, now I feel intuitively that I'm wrong. Help!
Hold on to the feeling that you are missing something!  Keep open to
the possibility of rational debate.  You can't find absolutes - admit
that you are looking for them!  Relativism is philosophic hell - even
if its arguments seem flawless, hold back from it.  The sign over the
gate reads, 'Abandon hope all you who enter here.'  Relativism
relieves the pain like shooting oneself in the head relieves a
headache.

What sort of absolutes were you looking for?  What precisely are the
qualities that would satisfy your yearning?  It may appear that
contradictory qualities are required, but if we examine those
qualities more carefully, some sort of reconciliation may emerge.

>
>>
>> I agree that emotions and reason are inseparable, and indeed
>> integral
>> to one another - what seems to be a battle between reason and
>> emotion
>> is rather a battle between one kind of reason-emotion combination
>> against another.  But reason should be distinguished from a proof
>> within a formalized logical system.  The latter is a mechanical
>> manipulation of symbols, better done by a computer than a human
>> being.
>> But reason, or informal logic, cannot be pre-dictable - its results
>> cannot be "said before" they are said (they are made "logical" - put
>> in words "logos").
>
>I think I agree here. That's what angers me, in a way. We manipulate
>reason so that it fits some arbitrary framework (in this case, logic)
Formal Logic is based on the separability of form and content, or
symbol and its meaning.  The true relationship of form and content is
like that of reason and emotion as stated above.  For me, Formal Logic
only gets interesting once one starts talking about homomorphisms
(mappings that preserve structure) between form and content.  This is
what makes Godel's work so interesting.

>> >>Don't read philosophic works when you are too tired, or for some
>> >>other
>> >>reason you seem to find your mind is just going round in circles.
>> >
>> >Figured that out, too.
>> It's easy to forget, however.  The danger is a kind of impatience,
>> expecting to understand something by rushing headlong into it,
>> instead of making a strategic retreat to regroup one's forces to
>> attack the weakest point in the enemy's forces (if you will allow the
>> military metaphor). Sometimes the problem is simply not realizing
>> that the writer has changed the way in which ideas are being
>> presented without sufficient warning.  This seems to happen
>> surprisingly often in philosophic works.
>
>Yeah, I feel impatient, but I realize there's nothing I can DO about
>it. That causes more frustration. Of course, sometimes I need to just
>stop pondering whether I should get up and go read a few pages and
>just go DO it...
I don't understand the above paragraph, particularly in relation to my
own words preceding it.  Would you care to alleviate my frustration?
>

Gerald