BACK TO HOME PAGE
A Commentary on
Whose Justice? Which rationality?
a book by Alasdair MacIntyre, published Duckworth 1988 ISBN 0 7156 2199 8
This book of Alasdair MacIntyre’s seems to follow in many respects his previous books A Short History of Ethics and After Virtue. One feels that to a large extent he is re-writing the same work over and over again, which helps the reader to see how his thinking has developed over time, indeed a very consistent kind of development is revealed. (A fourth book, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, arguably belongs to the same series.) Common features are:
1) The ordering is as a historical narrative, a history of Ethics.
2) The same points about
dike, aręte, agathos
, etc. from Homer to Aristotle are made. It becomes a little tedious to read it yet again.
3) Extensive discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment. This historical phenomenon has perhaps been given less prominence by historians than it deserves, and MacIntyre’s discussion is educative.
4) A focus on ethics.
Changes:
1) Increasing emphasis on the role of traditions in Ethics.
2) More positive attitude to Christianity, and to Augustine and Aquinas in particular (much less discussion of Luther and the Protestant Reformation). The discussion of Aquinas’ ethics has been much extended – two whole chapters and more.
3) Greater emphasis on the historical details of the Scottish Enlightenment, to the detriment of the overall presentation. (Much of the material could have gone into an appendix, for instance, to emphasize that it is being used in an argument rather than directly being a contribution to that argument.)
As with the preceding works, I sympathize with most of his particular opinions and learn many interesting particular insights and bits of history, but I find that I emerge from the book very dissatisfied. In After Virtue it was clear that his final position was of little value – reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ in that the value lay in what was being rejected. In Whose Justice? he grapples with the issue of overcoming social or political fragmentation (what we were left with at the end of After Virtue), of ‘Overcoming a Conflict of Traditions’ (title of Chapter X, about Aquinas).
Even Chapter XIX ‘Tradition and Translation’ conveys the same combination of interesting points and overall disappointment. He does not explore the nature of traditions and differentiate between different kinds, his attention being focussed primarily on demolishing the theories of those who oppose any notion of tradition. He extends the term ‘tradition’ to cover all kinds of social entity and all kinds of ways of “handing down” something. He probably accepts that the sciences are distinct in kind from political parties, religions, and Philosophy. But the differences and relationships among all these are not discussed.
Thus Aquinas is portrayed as combining Aristotle and Augustine, but not as maintaining Philosophy and Theology as distinct disciplines even as he relates them. Much of the discussion in Chapter XIX is of how different cultures in quite separate societies come to relate to each other. He fails to face the problem of how to discuss the situation where the traditions are either no longer clearly marked as two separable groups of human beings (though perhaps clearly distinguished in other ways). He easily slips into talking as if a person can be outside his or her own tradition, exactly what he rightly criticizes the liberals for presuming to do. He does not pursue the question of how one tradition can interiorize its relationships with rivals (or exteriorize its relation to itself, which is the same thing) – how can a culture develop so that one of those involved in it can be like a stranger (a visiting anthropologist)? The stranger is like a child in that culture. Yet that culture too is like a child to the stranger’s culture as it becomes involved in that other culture.
(When societies first come into contact with one another, there is a painful process to be undergone just to develop mutual recognition as fellow human beings, with the moral implications which flow from that.)
This commentary is little more than miscellaneous notes expressing knee-jerk reactions to the text rather than any well thought-out criticism. They were mostly written straight after reading the whole book, and I deliberately focussed on the last few chapters in order to confront directly MacIntyre’s own views about justice and rationality, not because I thought these chapters the most worth reading. Also, they were mostly written before Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry came out (pub. Duckworth 1990). My time would have been better spent commenting on that, but too late! For those who have not read Whose Justice? Which Rationality? I suggest that you don’t, except perhaps the chapters on the Scottish Enlightenment for their historical interest. Read the other three books in the series instead, since they are all much better written.
References
The following two examples illustrate my way of giving references to passages in the book:
‘pix$3’ means in the third paragraph to begin on page ix.
‘p2$0’ means in that part of a paragraph which begins on page 1 which is found on page 2.
CONTENTS
Title
General Comments
Commentary on the PREFACE
Commentary on CHAPTER I : Rival Justices, Competing Rationalities
Commentary on CHAPTER II : Justice and Action in the Homeric Imagination
Commentary on CHAPTER XVII : Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition
Commentary on CHAPTER XVIII : The Rationality of Traditions
Commentary on CHAPTER XIX : Tradition and Translation
Commentary on CHAPTER XX : Contested Justices, Contested Rationalities
pix$1
"the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way which restores rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and commitments." (This is MacIntyre quoting from his earlier book After Virtue.)
What would constitute a re-statement of the Aristotelian tradition? The use of the word ‘restated’ here seems clearly to indicate that ‘the Aristotelian tradition’ is to be understood as ‘the Aristotelian philosophy’, i.e. reference to a particular philosophy, rather than to some religion or some ethico-political ideology. (Given that it must have ethical content, we can assume that MacIntyre is not referring to Aristotelian physics or biology.) Thus, publishing the texts of Aristotle, in the original Greek or in translation, would not be a "re-statement". But then, taking Aristotle’s ethics apart from the rest of his philosophy, let alone picking and choosing within his ethics plus selecting from what others have been inspired to write about ethics under the influence of Aristotle, is to play fast and loose with the "Aristotelian tradition" as a philosophy, and cannot therefore be called a "re-statement" of it. (One might make a distinction between Aristotelian philosophy and Aristotle’s philosophy, but the objection still stands.) The re-statement of a philosophy must in some sense be done by that philosophy itself.
I am not just quibbling here, or picking up on a careless turn of phrase. Philosophy cannot help to bring "rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and commitments" except through the "moral and social attitudes and commitments" implicit in doing Philosophy (by the nature of Philosophy).
pix$1
‘I promised a book in which I should attempt to say both what makes it rational to act in one way rather than another, and what makes it rational to advance and defend one conception of practical rationality rather than another. Here it is.’
The way he makes his attempt is totally contrary to his own conclusions. He discusses the traditions as if he is outside them all, trying to conclude that one must indeed start from within a tradition to get anywhere. His abstractness is apparent even in this statement of what he is attempting. He should state that he is attempting ‘both to say what makes it rational to act in one way rather than another and to say what makes it rational to advance and defend’ this
(not just ‘one’, but ‘this one’) ‘conception of practical rationality’, – the one being presented – ‘rather than another.’ My modification of the statement still leaves it abstract, but it has one less level of abstraction in it. He did not have to be explicit at the beginning of the book about his allegiance to Thomism, but at the end of the book he should have shown that his allegiance was there all along. To use his own words (p394$1), he should have tried to persuade the reader in such a way as to be able to say at the end of the book in regard to his judgment about Thomism, ‘this is not only … what I now take to be true but in some measure what I have always taken to be true.’
I could also have removed the qualification ‘practical’ in modifying the statement, since there can be no theoretical / practical dualism about rationality within Philosophy. (The dualism arises in maintaining Ethics distinct from Philosophy – i.e. in the ethico-political sphere. I’m not sure if it arises as a dualism in the religious sphere either.) There is, rather, a tension between the conception of rationality being affirmed or presented, and the conception of rationality being employed in making, and arguing for, that affirmation. Consistency, rationality, requires that these are not distinct conceptions of rationality.being employed in making, and arguing for, that affirmation. Consistency, rationality, requires that these are not distinct conceptions of rationality.
Pix$3
‘… any adequate morality of the virtues was said to require as its counterpart "a morality of laws" (After Virtue, second edition, pp. 150-152), a morality such that "knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice" (p. 152). A central preoccupation of this sequel to After Virtue is the nature of this connection between justice and laws.’
[Misprint corrected: added double quotation marks to complete MacIntyre’s first quotation from
After Virtue
in the above passage.]
MacIntyre does not seem to show much interest in legal matters, otherwise he would have given more attention, for instance, to the ancient cultures of Persia and Rome, to the code of Justinian, (of Hammurabi as well perhaps?) to medieval canon law, and certainly, since Augustine is clearly a favourite of his, to the tension between law and grace. His interest in law is only on a very abstract, general plane. His interest is not in the connection between justice and laws, but with the whole lot lumped together into something called a tradition. (See p3$1 and my notes on it as to what traditions are.)
Rival Justices, Competing Rationalities
pp1-2 MacIntyre claims that there is confusion about the nature of justice.
p2$0 ‘How ought we to decide among the claims of rival and incompatible accounts of justice competing for our moral, social and political allegiance?’
This is the key question of his work, but the way it is posed is seriously flawed, in that it assumes a liberal standpoint, the very position which the whole work seems to be directed against. As a local native (in rural Ireland) said to a tourist asking for directions to a place, ‘If I were you, I wouldn’t start here.’
p2$1 MacIntyre claims that there is confusion about the nature of practical rationality.
P2$2 Not only not being solved, but no forum for any rational debate about issues.
P3$1 Forums: 1) academic philosophy; 2) communities of shared belief (e.g. religious communities); 3) certain kinds of political association. MacIntyre actually lumps types 2 and 3 together as communities of shared belief, so I am distorting his account slightly here. It is also interesting to note that he mentions enquiries among type 1. In general he treats ‘moral enquiries’ as covering all kinds of forums for discussions about ethics.
MacIntyre’s division here corresponds, very roughly (i.e. after my subdivision of the second type), with the division into philosophic, religious, and political (or ethico-political – I won’t be making any distinction between ethics and politics in this commentary). MacIntyre’s discussion throughout the book does not go into the different ways in which practical rationality is handed down, although he gives some awareness at this point of the great variety in type, and degree, of organization that may be involved. Thus he can only bring out certain parallels between them, parallels which are also shared with the sciences (systematic enquiries) and possibly some kinds of non-religious, non-political associations – some professional associations, perhaps? But where different kinds of ‘rational enquiry’ are interacting his discussion is going to be very confused.
P4$1 ‘ A certain degree of circularity is ineliminable.’
A vicious circle must be transformed into a virtuous spiral.
P4$2 – p5$3 Aristotle on rejecting the law of non-contradiction – Is this not how MacIntyre should argue for Thomism, or whatever philosophic tradition he considers himself participating in? In a religious tradition, the laws of logic will not have the same role, but that does not mean that there is not something with an equivalent role – hence the suspicion about "rational argument" may have a perfectly rational justification, and also the suspicion about ‘a way of uniting conviction on such matters with rational justification.’ (p6$0). The uniting should not blur the distinctions between the different kinds of tradition.
Commentary on CHAPTER II
Justice and Action in the Homeric Imagination
Arete
– no distinction in Homeric or monolithic society between fulfilling a function in society and fulfilling oneself as a person. See notes to pp374ff. But if a society is morally reflexive, then there is a distinction between the ideology of a free political association and the structures of the coercive state. Arete and dikaiosyne are "ambivalent" – i.e. they are mediated through social forms within the society. One’s function in society is seen as different according to ideological viewpoint, and social structures can be morally assessed (because changes seen as in some degree chosen). What is good for the person and what is good for society must ultimately be found to be the same. But what appears to be good for the person and what appears to be good for the society may clash with each other, and require modifying and developing till they are reconciled in practice.
Commentary on CHAPTER XVII
Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition
Pp326-8
MacIntyre’s criticism of "cosmopolitan modernity" is only correct in so far as there is stress on the immediate intelligibility of alien cultures. The rational hegemony, though not the rational superiority, if that is taken in an exclusive sense, of a philosophic work may be justified within its particular philosophy, although it has still to be exhibited and justified to those who reject it or do not know of it, i.e. those who do not yet recognize that its philosophy is Philosophy in general. Confidence in ultimate translucence (clarity) of the work may be justified, although it may require a considerable stretch of time to realize this, and hence exhibit its rational hegemony.
P333$1
‘… Hence the appeal to examples must be in vain.’
No, not necessarily in vain. The examples are coloured and selected by the theory, but they are not entirely determined by the theory. The appeal can in turn modify the theory. In a science, data is theory-laden, but this does not invalidate testing of the theory, or necessarily render the data useless as data for testing another theory.s theory-laden, but this does not invalidate testing of the theory, or necessarily render the data useless as data for testing another theory.
In this whole chapter on liberalism (pp326-348) he fails to notice that the conclusions of his own arguments have repercussions for his way of treating liberalism: a similar failure of reflection to that of the liberalism being attacked.hat of the liberalism being attacked.
His conclusion, as put into my own words, is that liberalism cannot become a coherent ideology since it cannot ever recognize itself as an ideology. Thus he should not talk of liberalism as a (political) tradition in its own right, let alone as something that could be transformed into a (political) tradition. Instead, he should treat the term ‘liberalism’ as an abstraction, a class of ideologies or a kind of tendency in some, or all, ideologies. Taking the first option, treating liberalism as a class of ideologies, one may still have to call a specific ideology liberalism because those with whom one is engaged in political debate call it liberalism, or call its adherents liberals. But then, in going along with this usage, MacIntyrei’s argument should not be directly against that particular ideology, but against regarding the term ‘liberalism’ as sufficiently descriptive of what that ideology is. If the debate is with self-proclaimed liberals, then MacIntyre’s argument should be to show to these self-proclaimed liberals that they have misunderstood the nature of their own political involvement. (These implications still hold even if liberalism is a class of ideologies which happens to have only one ideology as a member.)
Taking the second option, treating liberalism as a kind of tendency within ideologies, then perhaps MacIntyre should drop using the word liberalism altogether, with just an occasional mention of "liberal" tendencies within the context of an exploration of the nature of ideologies, in particular the relationships between political parties and the State. A liberal tendency might be seen as arising from trying to cope with conflict with other ideologies, but needing to be balanced by, and perhaps not even isolable from, other tendencies.
P348 tradition – windowless monad of Leibniz
Commentary on CHAPTER XVIII
The Rationality of Traditions
P351 ‘… confronted with a number of …’ the confrontation is already seen from within one – MacIntyre concedes too much to liberalism here – see comments on p393.
P353$1 Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophies fail to recognize the rationality of traditions because they fail to find a positive role for historical contingency within rationality. In this failure the history of the retreat of Ancient Greek Philosophy from political life in the Hellenistic Period is repeated. In such periods Philosophy can only destroy social life, and is unable to help to re-build social life. Hegel is the one post-Kantian philosopher who opposes the trend, but not successfully. (Marx never understood this aspect of Hegel’s thought, and Marxism reflects, better than Comte’s thought, the tendency to turn Philosophy into religion so typical of the Hellenistic Period. Burke upheld contingency, but over against rationality.)
MacIntyre’s attack here on the Enlightenment and the post-Enlightenment applies much more generally to Philosophy; there is a serious problem about recognizing the role of “traditions” – about allotting universal significance to concrete particulars. Even Hegel only does so in an abstract way.
P354$0 Extending Newman: here is the central issue of transferring political / theological insights to Philosophy – not simply a question of qualifications and additions (i.e. of packaging for use in a more general context).
P356$1 MacIntyre here confuses the claim or awareness that some judgement is false with what it is for a judgement to be false, i.e. with what constitutes a judgment as being false. This seems a rather unusual, perhaps unique, confusion, but probably derives in some way from a much more common kind of confusion. Under the influence of Descartes’ emphasis on Epistemology it is common for people to be confused between the criteria for recognizing true judgements and the concept of truth, what it is for (what constitutes) judgments to be true. E.g. the claim that truth is warranted assertibility. (See p363$2 and notes).
MacIntyre seems to be twisting himself in knots in this paragraph, making things appear more complicated than they are. What he claims is "the original and most elementary version of the correspondence theory of truth&" is neither the original version nor the most elementary version. (The latter claim is indeed laughable.) I detect a whiff of the Popperian myth of falsifiability in it.
P358$2 An ideology’s recognition of itself (as totally embodied) entails recognition of the possibility of other ideologies, and of internal fragmentation (factional fighting etc.).
P359$1 Although Descartes is clearly influenced philosophically as well as theologically by Augustine (e.g. autobiographical form of exposition, mind / body dualism and emphasis on interior life) I question MacIntyre’s description of Descartes as "a late follower of the Augustinian tradition." The notion of ‘the Augustinian tradition’ is too vague to be given any more content than is given by talk about being influenced directly and indirectly by Augustine. The only institutional connection is the Catholic Church. It would have been possible for Descartes to have become an Austin friar, in which case MacIntyre’s description would have been much more apt, though probably further from MacIntyre’s intended meaning.
A recently published history of Philosophy makes an identification of Augustine’s philosophy with whatever is preached from pulpits today. For that historian, then, Descartes would have been a follower of the Augustinian tradition simply in virtue of being a Christian. The historian may find some support for this in Augustine’s own description of Christianity as the one true philosophy. But I don’t think MacIntyre is using ‘the Augustinian tradition’ in the same sense and, since most people in Europe in Descartes’ day were Christian, his description of Descartes would be rather vacuous if he were using it in the same sense.
Pp360-1 MacIntyre is not fair to Hegel and he fails to recognize the need to anticipate goals.
P361$0 ‘mind could by its own powers.’
MacIntyre is here alluding to the notion of divine grace, related to the notion of givenness in a science (the existence of data) and perhaps Heidegger’s Gelassenheit (releasement, letting be). Hegel’s lack of such a notion would seem to explain his problem about writing introductions to his system – trying to pull himself up by his own bootstraps.
P361$0 ‘… the future possibility of their present beliefs and judgments being shown to be inadequate in a variety of ways.’
But in so far as they are shown to be inadequate they are already being transformed into something more adequate. The reflexivity of a tradition helps to sustain it through such change (and indeed helps to stimulate such change). The change itself may bring about a loss of reflexivity – it may lose any coherent identity. E.g. the change may involve its complete assimilation into another tradition as a tributary stream into a river.
P361$1 ‘Traditions also fail the Hegelian test of showing that their goal is some final rational state which they share with all other movements of thought.’ It is not a test, but the goal is itself the showing – if it ultimately fails, the goal itself fails to be attained. Political parties, by definition (as opposed to single issue campaigns or power group lobbies – not quite in line with popular usage of the word ‘party’ in that I am excluding minority parties), seek universal, full power, which goal, being achieved through democratic means, entails holding that their goal is some final rational state which they share with all other movements of thought.
P361$2 Epistemological crisis: a tradition disintegrates as a coherent enquiry, crisis resolved as re-integration of fragments about a newly emerging tradition which contains the old in the sense that there exists a continuity of fragments. Old not destroyed, but fades away. Nor can the new tradition be a mere transplant of an existing tradition from elsewhere (it would at least have to be a cutting which has to be grafted on). MacIntyre’s claim that a ‘tradition-constituted enquiry’ could reject itself in toto is wrong – same paradox as that of Descartes’ universal doubt.
P363$2 Concept of truth different from concept of warranted assertibility (see p356$1). This is not to deny that criteria for judging truth have an important role to play in explaining the concept of truth. But then what we in fact hold to be true has an equally important role.
P365$0 "… Derived as it is from a genuinely alien tradition, the new explanation does not stand in any sort of substantive continuity with the preceding history of the tradition in crisis."
Breaking the third requirement of a solution to a crisis – see p362$1.
MacIntyre neglects to discuss two kinds of situation when he argues that one tradition can be defeated by another according to its own standards of (practical) rationality. (I put ‘practical’ in brackets since the discussion has a wider relevance than to Ethics.) The two kinds are:
1)
The two traditions need not be mutually exclusive, but fuse together. Both may be in substantive continuity with the resultant single tradition.
2)
The two traditions develop alongside each other, constantly in tension with one another, yet each not incapable of finding a place for the other in its own life. This is most easily seen where we are talking of two very different kinds of tradition (for whom substantive continuity will take very different forms).
Any actual case will be somewhere between 1) and 2) and mutual annihilation or confusion (myriads of sickly half-breeds). For a conflict to be resolved rationally can only mean that each must be able to rationally transform itself. Self-criticism turns defeat into a kind of victory. to rationally transform itself. Self-criticism turns defeat into a kind of victory.
Defeat:
1) Membership and activity of tradition dwindles to nothing.
2) Tradition fragments into many traditions each regarding themselves as original tradition.
Merging traditions: one tradition may be seen as transforming itself more radically than the other – the other dominates the result. Particularly the case if the first tradition seems to fit "monolithic" appearance more closely – i.e. self-transformation less explicitly expressed in social / intellectual structure. Hence the result appears in less substantive continuity with it.
P366$1 MacIntyre does not discuss problems of distinguishing between traditions. When discussing problems about one tradition relating to another, the distinction between the two traditions is taken as given and fixed. Hence MacIntyre seems to think only in terms of traditions discrediting themselves, defeating others, or merely co-existing with one another. MacIntyre’s notion of a tradition is of it self-contained, like the notion of a monolithic society (see notes to pp374$1ff below). He does not consider the possibility that two traditions may fuse together, and both be in substantive continuity with the resultant single tradition. E.g. the conflict between the two traditions may come to be what is handed down, with the two original traditions preserved as the protagonists defined by the internalized conflict.
Commentary on CHAPTER XIX
Tradition and Translation
Pp374$1ff Appealing to simpler forms of society can be very misleading. Their very lack of differentiation may disguise certain aspects which are nevertheless present, aspects more clearly seen and more easily discussed in apparently more complicated societies. A monolithic society, where ideology and culture are not distinct (not just coincident) is a fiction. For to recognize such a society as a society, the society must be supposed as being opened up to us. (It must be possible to impute mutual recognition.) Thus we posit ambivalence (a mediation by free association – see notes to Chapter II) even though it is not manifested (no discernible free associations within the society). We posit social reflexivity though not manifested in social structures just as we might posit what some one is thinking though nothing is said. The monolithic society is the collective equivalent of Rousseau’s noble savage.
The monolithic societies cannot be conscious of themselves as wholes which are particular – each cannot be conscious of itself as a single society alongside other potential, let alone actual, societies. Other actual societies must appear to them as impersonal, their members as subhuman or superhuman. We do in fact see such tendencies in primitive societies on initial contact with a wider world, but it is like the meteoric flare as the culture meets a quick death. Anything which survives, survives precisely because the society was not a truly monolithic one.
The very fact that ‘the tie between language and communal belief’ may be ‘relatively close’ is precisely why discussing an apparently simpler society is more likely to go astray – it has to work harder to find the words to discuss it.
MacIntyre’s discussions of apparent examples of monolithic societies (Homeric Greece in Chapter II, Tory Island on pp376$3-378$1) should therefore be replaced by discussion of coherent universalizing ideologies manifested in well-defined free political associations. (There may still be some value in discussing Homeric Greece as the womb of Philosophy, but not treating it as if it was a monolithic society.)
Pp376$2-379$0 Naming – like finding key terms in a philosophic theory. As such they are not readily translatable.
Names with low information content – persons not identified with social roles.
P379 MacIntyre almost concedes liberalism’s point in talking of a social and cultural order in which "a minimum of shared beliefs and allegiances can be presupposed." A liberal does not have to suppose that the "single essential relation of reference" is ever more than approximated to in practice. (I.e. concept of pure reference need only exist as a target to be aimed at.) Criticism of liberalism should show that such a target fails to give proper guidance. Absence of shared background beliefs = absence of social and cultural order.
P380$0 Incommensurable in this context implies incompatible. Each society takes itself to be absolute in such a way as to rule out implicitly the very existence of the other (the members of the other appear impersonal). If the absoluteness is mediated, then it can be less exclusive – what MacIntyre calls ambivalence in Chapter II.
P380 translation-plus-explanation
The result of transfiguration of a text can be a text discussing the transfiguration that has been performed. In such a case the ‘plus’ does not mean some extra words alongside, but a double role for the same words.
P384$4 The translation, except in the case of Philosophy, is not merely of words, and texts, but of whatever kind of material provides the substantive continuity of the tradition. The translation of social structures is more like reproduction, sexual or asexual, than a one-to-one mapping or implementation of a blueprint. Even in Philosophy, translatability ("transfigurability") between philosophies has to be built up gradually by trial and error, starting with the most tenuous of links but going the whole way social structures is more like reproduction, sexual or asexual, than a one-to-one mapping or implementation of a blueprint. Even in Philosophy, translatability ("transfigurability") between philosophies has to be built up gradually by trial and error, starting with the most tenuous of links but going the whole way – i.e. ‘gradually’ should not be understood in terms of steps between the two philosophies.
P385 MacIntyre is only correct about languages of modernity in so far as those languages are taken by liberals to be already sufficient to explain everything, without the need for further development. But MacIntyre is wrong to rule out anticipation of explaining everything.
Pp385-6 What is criticized here is not far from the correct view of what a philosophic tradition is, and MacIntyre is only right in so far as there fails to be any grappling with, or evaluating of, the ideas in the set texts.
P386$1-$2 on Roland Barthes. There may be an indefinite number of possible interpretations and translations, but the number of interpretations and translations carried out is always finite. The criteria to guide selection may be found partly in what, according to the interpretations, the original text is found to say about the nature of Philosophy, and hence its own interpretation, and partly in the success in relating to other texts.
P387 I agree with "modernity" in that no intellectual life will be forever inaccessible, but reject it in so far as modernity does not accept that this access requires "modernist languages" to be transformed. MacIntyre is wrong in so far as he is claiming the existence of anything in particular being permanently inaccessible no matter how modern languages may develop.
P388$1 "Only those whose tradition allows for the possibility of its hegemony being put in question can have rational warrant for asserting such a hegemony."
Thus even when an ideology has won over all the members of the society it must still be distinguished from the general culture, which means that its social form must be distinguished from that through which the consensus of society as a whole is articulated, however much the two agree. A free association seeking universal membership must continually try to win over even its own members. Thus it is able to recognize the possibility of new political insights which it is as yet unable to incorporate: in MacIntyre’s terms, the possibility of not being immediately translatable, not the possibility of permanent untranslatability.
Commentary on CHAPTER XX
Contested Justices, Contested Rationalities
P391$1 MacIntyre is wrong here – if there is a break in a tradition, then one cannot talk of the same tradition as resuming at some later time – a break in the handing down means that it is not handed down. Taken philosophically, Aristotle’s political ideas are part of the unbroken tradition of Philosophy, and hence very much preserved. But taken politically, they died with the Ancient Greek polis – i.e. even before Aristotle. The "re-embodiment" is not the resumption of the same political tradition, but new outgrowths from the same philosophic tradition.
P391$1 Where does a political tradition exist when it is not being embodied in institutions? It exists no longer as a political tradition, but as a memory within another kind of tradition: Philosophy, Church, a university, Anthropology, etc..
P393 MacIntyre takes the reader to be "someone who, not as yet having given their allegiance to some coherent tradition of enquiry, …"
This is a mistake – MacIntyre is here making the same mistake as he wants to accuse liberalism of making. Political debate can only proceed from whatever social structures already exist. Argument must proceed from exposing the reader to that to which the reader is already committed, and in so doing transforming that commitment and, hopefully, providing it with a lasting basis (rational justification). It is in recognizing commitments already adhered to that MacIntyre’s selection of a "tradition of enquiry" could be prevented from being arbitrary – commitments are already given to some extent in being born into a particular family. (Rather like old nature/nurture issue.) MacIntyre does not give us his autobiography to justify his selection.
Confronted with a set of rival traditions? (MacIntyre here talks of rival intellectual positions, but we may still suppose he means ideologies.) That is already a distortion of any actual situation. No one approaches the issue with a tabula rasa, with no ideological commitment already there. Every person is born into a family, every person emerges as a person from within a network social relationships. If the person has lost all ideological commitment, the person has ceased to be a person (sociopath / psychopath) – ceased to have the capacity for rational discussion of the matter according to MacIntyre’s own arguments. It is only on the basis of what commitment is left that a person can confront "a set of ideologies". The person confronting a set of rival ideologies – and recognizing them as being such – must already be committed to an ideology sophisticated enough to encompass the notion of that rivalry. The commitment must be made explicit before the person goes mad – falls apart. The commitment must be retrospectively revealed. The reader MacIntyre is addressing must be led to find that he or she has been committed to a coherent ideology all along, without knowing it.
P393$1 ‘… and whether or not they inhabit any tradition.’ An example of an unnecessary remark. The option has been ruled out in rejecting liberalism. Far from helping the flow of his writing style, his redundant qualifications often make it jerky. But here we have an example of something not merely stylistic, but showing serious confusion of thought. He clearly does not quite believe his own argument against liberalism, and fails to distinguish between a person’s feeling of a lack of commitment to any of the particular well-marked ideologies, and the person actually being ideologically committed even in that very feeling. If the person really inhabits no tradition, then no particular beliefs, not even liberal beliefs, can be attributed to that person.
Pp393-4 "The wider audience to whom we aspire to speak" – to speak straightaway – "the less we shall speak to anyone in particular." MacIntyre’s assertion is not correct as it stands because we can aspire to speak so as to reach everyone ultimately, and hence I inserted the qualification ‘to speak straightaway’. MacIntyre himself implicitly makes the error of aspiring to speak straightaway to all – he only backs down at the end with the naming of the tradition he has chosen – a choice which he admits will not be acceptable to all his readers (indeed a choice which appears rather like an arbitrary act of will!).
P395$2 The capacity for recognition of oneself as being already at home to some degree in some philosophy is precisely that on which MacIntyre should have based his whole argument. His own arguments are enough to show that the person "alien to every philosophic tradition of enquiry" cannot meaningfully be said to exist. The tradition endorsed is not endorsed so arbitrarily – it must be the tradition which MacIntyre is already engaged in while writing his book – his book must itself be the basis of the contingent element. In other words, the endorsement must be justified by reference to the existence of his book itself.
P395$2 Again MacIntyre takes the claims of liberals too much at face value. The person described cannot bring anything to the encounter without adhering to a tradition of enquiry – the person cannot even bring standards of rational justification. The refutation of liberalism lies precisely in the fact that its claims about itself cannot be true.
P397$1 In so far as liberalism cannot be an ideology (because it is incoherent) there can be no person who is truly liberal. MacIntyre does not realize that his own argument tends to rule out the meaningfulness of claiming that any actual person is a liberal. (Just as, in so far as a philosophy may be said to be false it is not a philosophy, and those who believe themselves engaged in it misunderstand what they are doing.)
P398 The fault in liberalism is not the fact of tolerating incompatible views – that is its strength, in that views are not ruled out or endorsed too hastily. The fault is that there is no genuine debate at all, no serious grappling with ideas. The fault is not in incoherence, but in not struggling to be coherent. (The parallel in Philosophy would be a person asking questions but not wanting any answers.)
P399$$1-2 Academic posts in Theology or Divinity should not be filled exclusively at the discretion of the universities, but also at the discretion of the relevant religious authorities. By "relevant" I mean relevant to the kind of religious or denominational viewpoint the post is set up for. Thus universities remain secular while taking seriously the social embodiment of religions. Similarly, with regard to the filling of academic posts in the study of Politics, the appointments must be made, and continuation in posts maintained, by joint agreement between the academic institution and the relevant political parties (though "political parties" may be interpreted in a much wider sense than is now current). All sorts of messy compromises will have to be made about the allocation of posts, and even about what posts to have. It may often have to be the case that the same post is the joint concern of several parties, but if there arises a clash among those parties, the holder of the post should not be expected to maintain a neutral stance, and so his or her allegiance should be clear at all times. Clearly a university decides the nature of the particular posts it wants filled, but, for the university to avoid fictitious objectivity, the nature of those posts should be such as to involve political parties in deciding who fills them and continues to fill them.
In the case of Philosophy (including Philosophy of Religion as opposed to Natural Theology, the two need not be synonymous), all institutions, even academic ones, should be excluded from direct control of the direction of the debate. Clearly indirect influence is inevitable through the appointment of staff, setting of syllabuses, awarding of degrees, etc. Also, for instance, academic journals can have much influence. But the primary embodiment of philosophic tradition is in philosophic texts and discussions, not Philosophy departments or journal editors. If such texts themselves discuss their relationship with academic institutions, then this should counteract the danger of the academic institutions assuming a "fictitious objectivity".
P400$1 What of Mathematics? What tradition of enquiry in Mathematics could there be such as to guide the choice of research topics and funding?
As for the humanities, some of these are sciences (e.g. History), which have only failed to be recognized as such because of a false dichotomy of nature and society (propagated by Dithey, e.g.), or because one specialized science has been taken to be the archetype for all (usually Newtonian Mechanics, even though Physics has long since abandoned it), so mistakenly treating certain special characteristics as essential or as ideal in being a science. But some of these are on the way to being the academic study of religion and politics. There is already an example of such in the existence of “Marxist approaches”, “Freudian approaches” and “feminist approaches”. Can there be conceptual schemes which are not philosophic, religious, or political in kind, but serve the needs of, and are even sustained by their use in, the academic teaching of literary criticism, or whatever? If literary criticism can be turned into a science, i.e. a systematic branch of knowledge like History, then the answer must be yes. But it is hard to see how this can be the case for literary criticism in a way distinctive from both Philosophy and History. What of criticism of works of architecture, of paintings, etc.?
P401$1 ‘… what I have said about traditions of rational enquiry in general has been at best a sketch …’
I think that MacIntyre’s meaning here is that to answer the preceding question about circumvention and subversion of liberalism requires elaborating a response from a particular tradition. He is implicitly confessing that the book’s approach has been "liberal" in the way which he has criticized liberalism for being. He supposes that what he has already said about traditions in general has not already presupposed the view of the subject matter from a particular tradition, but that he has now reached the point when he must presuppose the viewpoint of a particular tradition. He is failing to distinguish between implicit and explicit presupposition. He must in fact presuppose a tradition from the beginning of his book, and some divergence from other traditions will inevitably have become apparent at various points in the book, although he may leave it to the end of his book to reveal fully and explicitly the tradition he has supposed throughout. He should have written: ‘It is no longer possible to discuss the subject matter without naming the standpoint which I have been writing from throughout.’ But MacIntyre still talks as if he is at some point just prior to making a commitment, a condition he can only break out of by some arbitrary act of will – the dilemma of a liberal.
P401$2 "There are, that is to say, at least four alternative ways of continuing the narratives of the earlier chapters, at least four alternative ways of moving this book toward further conclusions, but no one author could write more than one of them."
Philosophically, there are not four such possible ways that MacIntyre might move the book forward, even from the point of view of the reader, there is only the Thomist way. For, in the narrow sense of classification he suggests, MacIntyre has nothing more to reveal to us about which tradition he has been viewing things from. Indeed, it is a kind of tribute to his consistency that the other three options are already ruled out from the point of view of any attentive reader.
I note, however, that ‘four’ is qualified with ‘at least’, so perhaps he is being more tentative about his classification than I am taking him to be.
P402 MacIntyre tries to point out the need for political thought to reflect on its social manifestation, but he himself remains detached in this work, doing such reflecting only in an abstract way ("abstract" that is, from a political perspective). What ideology does he share with his reader, or at least appeal to in his arguments? None explicitly. He names his commitment, but it is not to some ideology or religion. MacIntyre’s own ‘tradition of enquiry’, for the purpose of the book, is effectively a philosophic tradition, for it starts in Aristotle and proceeds through Aquinas, undergoes a negative experience in the Scottish Enlightenment, to emerge as some sort of neo-Thomism. (He is not explicit about what it emerges as – perhaps because he doesn’t know yet – all is to be revealed in the follow-up.)
Back to TOP