In order to find the Geist of systematic commentary on Hegel’s works, we must first of all indicate the Geist of studying and interpreting Hegel’s works in general, and secondly, develop the distinction between, on the one hand, analysis of, and interpreting, the texts, and on the other hand, composing the systematic commentary.

What are Hegel’s works – i.e., not which manuscripts should be categorized as his works, but what sort of philosophic thing is given through his works as a whole (and how is it given)?   I propose to answer this general question by reference to the notions of analysis of texts and of systematic commentary.   Hegel’s works confront us as a riddle and a problem, whose solution both attracts and repels us: attracts us, because the explanation of everything is presaged in it (presaged as an explanation which includes the explanation of itself); repels us, because Hegel’s works seem to have an alien way of using language, in which direct explanation does not find itself.   Thus we start from wonder, as Aristotle understood all enquiry to do.   We start to read his works, we collect facts about the manifold formations and patterns of words in his works; this procedure, on its own account, runs on into endless detail in all directions, and just because no end can be perceived in it, this method does not satisfy us.   And in all this wealth of ideas the question can again arise, or perhaps come to us for the first time: What is Hegel’s explanation?   It remains a problem.   When we see the processes and transformations in Hegel’s works we want to grasp the simple nature of them (the content of his theory), to compel the Nietzschean worm to cease its wriggling enough to show itself to us and declare itself to us; so that it may not present us with a variety of ever new positions, but in a simpler fashion bring into words we can grasp what it is.
This search for immediacy and intelligibility can be understood in various ways, and can often refer simply to a dictionary meaning, as in the question: What does ‘Selbstbewusstsein’ mean?   or the enquirer may be familiar with the German word (or its translation as ‘self-consciousness’) and want to understand how it is used in Hegel’s works by being shown example passages in his works.   Or maybe the enquirer wants to know how important it is in Hegel’s system as a whole.   But here we are asking what are Hegel’s works as a whole.   (The question assumes that there is coherence.)   It is the meaning to be attached to this question that I propose that we examine here, remembering that I want to help you to understand this commentary on Hegel.

I could straightaway appeal to Hegel’s absolute Geist and claim that a systematic commentary ought to give us the Absolute Geist of commentary on his works.   But to begin thus might be confusing.   For we must grasp the Absolute Geist itself as concrete and thus apprehend its various articulations and then bring those articulations together.   In order therefore to possess the Absolute Geist as manifested in Hegel’s works we have to have read his works through which the absolute Geist is first there for us.   Likewise, to possess the Absolute Geist of this commentary, you must have already read this commentary.   (Even assuming that it is the same absolute Geist – and, in some sense, there can only be one – we cannot use that assumption here.)   If we have familiarized ourselves with Hegel’s works, and say that we now want to approach Hegel’s works as philosophic commentators, then there are two ways of approaching his works which are readily seen to be open to us – consumer oriented and disciple oriented.   I discuss them here in order to show them both to be requisite for understanding the Absolute Geist and argue for an approach to Hegel’s works which combines them as distinct elements or Hegelian moments within it.   An examination of the disciple oriented approach will reveal a conflict within itself which will lead us to our standpoint; to resolve the conflict we must incorporate what is peculiar to the consumer oriented approach, and by this means consumer and disciple orientations will be united and integrated into a totality.

In the consumer oriented approach to Hegel’s works, the latter is, for us, something visible and external, something to be read; and we (the readers) are external and therefore contingent to his philosophy, although in relation to Hegel’s works we – readers of Hegel collectively – are its consciously free substance (the locus of its philosophy as a historical phenomenon).   A consideration of Hegel’s works according to this relationship yields the standpoint of the Moral Life (see introd EG §§513-517).   In this, we find the correct presupposition that Hegel’s works, in their externality, do not themselves contain the absolute final philosophic standpoint. .   But if this way of considering Hegel’s works starts from the particular, limited philosophic purposes (ethical duties) of the reader, on the one hand it makes these purposes or concerns (or duties) into presuppositions whose contingent content may in itself be insignificant and trivial.   On the other hand, the relation of Hegel’s works to the reader’s purposes or concerns demands for itself a deeper mode of treatment than simply as material to realize them, namely, the mode of treatment of the Geist, which in Nature is immanent and therefore is immanent in the marks on paper (or on screen) which are Hegel’s works.

The consumer oriented approach to Hegel’s philosophy is, in general, determined by the preoccupations of the reader, the reader’s philosophy seeks itself in Hegel’s works.   (Hegel’s philosophy is consumed – broken up and re-formed to provide the material for the growth and replication of the reader’s own philosophy.)   Need impels our philosophizing to use Hegel’s works for our own advantage, to wear Hegel’s ideas out, to wear them down, in short to annihilate them.   And here, two characteristics at once stand out.
First characteristic of consumer approach
The consumer approach is concerned only with individual parts of Hegel’s system (e.g. Philosophy of History), or with individual aspects of the whole system (e.g. the religious dimension).   (Perhaps the part/aspect distinction is not sustainable with regard to Hegel’s system.)   There are an almost endless variety of ways of using Hegel’s works, as the last two hundred years of Philosophy show.   Whatever arguments Hegel develops and lets loose against the position of the reader, the reader can find other arguments in Hegel’s works to use to counter them.   Hegel’s works enable the reader to preserve and maintain a particular position in the face of the former arguments, by sheltering behind other parts or aspects of Hegel’s system, and letting these suffer the destructive force of such attacks.   Hegel’s system itself, however, as a theory of everything, the reader cannot overcome in this way, for it cannot be subordinated to the reader’s own purposes.
Second characteristic of consumer approach
The other characteristic of the consumer oriented approach is that, since it is our limited philosophic purposes which are paramount, not Hegel’s works, we convert the latter into means, the destiny of which is determined by us, not by (the content of) Hegel’s works themselves (his works are just food for our thought).
Result of consumer approach
What is achieved is the satisfaction of our philosophy, which had been disturbed by a lack of some kind or another.
The incompleteness of the exposition of the theory of everything which its project suffers as a hunger to comprehend and interpret Hegel’s works, is at the same time present as something other than the exposition, as Hegel’s works to be consumed, to be comprehended; the project is the annulling of this alienation by making Hegel’s system identical with its own theory, or by restoring its own self-unity through sacrificing Hegel’s works.   (This example is taken from the Speculative part of this Commentary.)

The consumer oriented approach to Hegel’s works presupposes some sort of system, but this presupposition tends to be confined to supplying an external purposiveness only, to taking its own system as manifested only as purposes being served by Hegel’s works; and thus the purposes which Hegel’s works are shown to subserve tend to be so trivial that the approach becomes discredited as a way of doing philosophy.   However, the consumer oriented approach need not be exclusively consumer oriented, as it is, for example, when I say that Hegel’s works are only there to provide me with something to comment on (like sheep for wool to clothe my thoughts – my thoughts themselves not being woolly, of course).
The determination of a philosophy as immanent in Hegel’s works is to see Hegel’s works as the determinateness of the philosophy.   For example, Hegel’s own example of "the seed of a plant which contains the real possibility of all that is to exist in the tree" [EN §245Zu Miller trans.] as an argument is directed solely to the self-preservation of what is explanatory in Hegel’s works.   This activity is the philosophy of the work; the true use of Biology here consists therefore in the method of regarding Hegel’s works as free in their own peculiar philosophic activity.

What has just been called interpretation or analysis (see end of section 1) is a philosophic consideration of Hegel’s works; but, on the one hand, it does not start from determinations which are external to Hegel’s works, as the consumer starts from a hunger; and secondly, it is directed to an exposition of the theory of everything in Hegel’s works, a theory which is also explained within itself – directed to a better presentation of a set of arguments and explanations, whose content must not be a simple aggregate, but arranged in orders and classes, must be presented more clearly as a system.   As this commentary is a comprehending treatment, it has as its object the same theory of everything, but explicitly, and it considers this theory in its own immanent necessity in accordance with the self-determination (in it) of the Geist.

Not only must what we say of Hegel’s philosophy be in agreement with what we find in Hegel’s works, but the origin and formation of the commentary presupposes and is conditioned by interpretation and analysis of Hegel’s works.   However, the course, from reading a philosophic passage to examining and constructing comments on it, is one thing, while the comments themselves and how they are ordered in the commentary which has resulted from that course, are another.   In the commentary, Hegel’s works can no longer appear as the foundation of the comments; here, the foundation must be the necessity of the Geist.

In the progress of this commentary, we must not only give an account of something as determined by its Geist, but we must also name the text of Hegel where it appears, and we must show that that text does, in fact, correspond to its Geist.   However, this is not an appeal to the fact of being in Hegel’s works and having the particular position it has in his works (his account of his system) as itself an account of it as determined by its Geist.   Even less admissible is the appeal to arbitrary parallels, which may be more or less significant, and which impress determinations and schemata on Hegel’s concepts only externally.

First characteristic of disciple approach
In the disciple oriented approach to Hegel’s works the first point is that we stand back from his works, leaving them as they are and adjusting ourselves to them.   Here, we start from our immediate understanding of his works as we read them.   However, if analysis of Hegel’s works were based solely on reading his works, and reading were nothing more than recognizing words, then any German opening one of Hegel’s works would be analysing them.   (On the other hand, I would be barred from doing such analysis, since I can only read him in translation.)   But the one reading is also philosophizing.   Now if we said that, in the disciple oriented approach to Hegel’s works, we left things free, this would apply only partly to our handling of the actual words of Hegel, for this handling would be itself partly as disciple and partly as consumer; it is only our systematic commenting that has this free relation to his works.   We can, of course, consider his works as for consumption, as a means to develop our own ideas; but then Hegel’s philosophy is itself only a set of ideas (a means), not a system (an end) in itself.
Second characteristic of disciple approach
The second bearing of (things in) Hegel’s works for us is that they acquire the character of universality for us or that we transform them into universals.   The more systematizing philosophy enters into our commenting on (analysing of) Hegel’s works, the less do those comments retain their Hegelian quality, the singularity and immediacy as something written by Hegel.   The wealth of Hegelian terms, in all their manifold configuration, is impoverished by the simplifying tendencies of further systematization, the writhing ceases and suggestive allusions fade away.   The rustle of Hegel’s philosophy is silenced in the stillness of the accurate summary; the abundance of Hegel’s philosophy, wearing a thousand wonderful and delightful shapes, shrivels into arid forms and shapeless generalities resembling a smog.
Result of disciple approach
These two characteristics are not only opposed to the two characteristics of the consumer oriented approach, but we also find that the disciple oriented approach is in conflict with itself, for it seems to bring about the direct opposite of what it intends; for we want to know what Hegel really wrote, not what he did not write.   But instead of leaving Hegel’s works as they are, and taking Hegel at his word, instead of simply reading those works, we make them into something quite different.   In thinking on Hegel’s words, we transform them into something universal; but they are singular and Hegel’s ideas do not exist apart from his words.   We give them the form of something we think, of something produced by us and belonging to us (something in our own words) in our specific way of philosophizing: for without us reading Hegel’s works, there can be no explanations or arguments in them.   But according to the second characteristic of the disciple oriented approach referred to above, it is precisely this inversion which does take place; in fact, it might seem that what we are beginning (this systematic commentary) is made impossible for us at the outset.   The disciple oriented approach begins with the silencing of one’s ideas, leaves aside preconceptions and prejudices, lets Hegel’s words speak and go on just as they are there to be found; with this attitude to Hegel’s works, we have straightaway established a duality of work and reader and their separation, something here and something yonder.   Our intention, however, is rather to grasp, to comprehend his works, to make them ours, so that the works are not alien and yonder.   Here, then, comes the difficulty: How can we as readers come to grasp what Hegel wrote?   If anyone ventures to bridge this gulf, then it would seem that their words must mislead us into reading them as Hegel’s, making Hegel’s works, which are an Other than a disciple’s comments, into an Other than what the works are.   Both disciple oriented characteristics are also directly opposed to each other: we transform Hegel’s words into universals, or make them our own, and yet as Hegel’s words they are supposed to be free for themselves (freely self-determining).   This, therefore, is the point with which we are concerned in regard to the Hegelian kind of account – this is the interest Hegel’s philosophy holds for Philosophy.

But the systematic commentary on Hegel is in the unfavourable position of having to demonstrate that it is a systematic commentary on Hegel, and, in order to justify it, we must make some sort of appeal to a state of being at home in Hegel’s philosophy.   Mention must be made here of a special solution of the clash between interpretation of Hegel’s works and Hegel’s works, a solution which makes short shrift of the whole difficulty.   The union of the two determinations, is namely, what we will call the #primal understanding (such as we may suppose Hegel himself to have had) [a sort of immediate understanding, so not to be confused with Verstand in Hegel's sense], where Philosophy is identical with Hegel’s works, and the philosophic eye is placed directly in the centre of Hegel’s works; whereas the standpoint of this commentary is in the fall of thinking from that eternal, absolute unity.   This eternal, absolute unity is represented as a #primal #intuition, catching hold of a theory of everything, which is at the same time one with immediate particular words, and in so doing gives those words a role in explaining everything.   This #intuitive grasping in words is the absolute Exposition; for the explanation of everything, we are entitled to say, is that theory in which Philosophy and words are united, in which philosophizing activity at the same time also has system and articulation.   The eccentricities of this (of the notion of) systematic commentary originate partly in such an absolute geist, namely in the absolute geist that, although what we write cannot be what Hegel wrote (we do not have the primal understanding), there still are the favoured ones, Hegelians to whom Hegel’s philosophy imparts true knowledge and wisdom in sleep; or that, even without being so favoured, one can at least, by faith in Hegel’s works, be transported into a state where the inner side of Hegel’s works (Hegel’s system) is immediately revealed, and where one need only let the words of Hegel’s works wash over one’s mind, i.e. become completely immersed in his jargon, in order to declare in a spontaneously Hegelian manner what is true.   This Hegelianized state, about the meaningfulness of which nothing further can be said, has, in general, been regarded as the consummation of the study of Hegel’s works; and it is, perhaps, added that, since that absolute unity was lost with Hegel’s death, there has remained for us in his works, as myths, allusions or in other vestiges, still some fragments and faint echoes of that philosophic, Hegelian state.   These fragments have formed the basis for the further Hegelian education of people, and are the source of all Hegelian development.   If it had not been made so difficult to understand Hegel, but one needed only to sit on the tripod, open a book of Hegel’s at random, and utter oracles, then, of course, the labour of systematic commentary would not be needed.

There is something lofty in this treatment of Hegel’s works which at first glance makes a strong appeal.   But this unity of philosophy and (Hegelian) intuition, of the inwardness of the explanation of everything and its relation to Hegel’s works, must be, not the beginning, but the goal, not an immediate, but a resultant unity.   An immediate unity of philosophy and Hegelian intuition is that of a pupil prior to studying Hegel’s works, and that can at most be called seeking to participate in, but not yet participating in, Hegel’s philosophy.   But one must have gone through the labour of studying Hegel’s works and the activity of making sense of them in order to become a Hegelian [to become some one who has learnt from Hegel], having overcome the separation between one’s own words and Hegel’s (between pupil and teacher).   The immediate unity is thus only an #abstract, #implicit #truth, not the #actual #truth; for not only must the content be true, but the form also.   The healing of this breach must be in the form of the #knowing Absolute Geist, and the moments of the solution must be sought in discussion itself.   It is not a question of going off to abstraction and vacuity, of taking refuge in the negation of knowing; on the contrary, discussion must preserve itself in that one must use the ordinary discussion itself to refute the assumptions which have given rise to the conflict.

The difficulty arising from the one-sided assumption of the disciple approach, that Hegel’s ideas confront us as permanent and impenetrable concepts, is directly negated by the consumer approach which acts on the philosophic belief that individual Hegelian concepts are nothing in themselves.   The defect of #appetite, from the side of its relation to Hegelian concepts, is not that it is #realistic towards them, but that it is all too #idealistic.   The final truth about Hegelian concepts is that as immediately single, they are only symbols . Of the claim that we cannot know things because they are absolutely shut to us, such a claim ignores the activity involved in perception [go after, seize, consume things].   The same thing is laid down in the second aspect of the disciple approach referred to above, namely, that we think #natural #objects.   #Intelligence familiarizes itself with things, not of course in their sensuous existence, but by thinking them and positing their content in itself; and in, so to speak, adding form, universality, to the #practical #ideality which, by itself, is only negativity, it gives an affirmative character to the negativity of the singular.
This universal aspect of things is not something subjective, something belonging to us: rather is it, in contrast to the transient phenomenon, the noumenon, the true, objective, actual nature of things themselves, like the Platonic Ideas, which are not somewhere afar off in the beyond, but exist in individual things as their substantial genera.   Not until one does violence to Proteus – that is not until one turns one’s back on the sensuous appearance of Nature – is he compelled to speak the truth.   The inscription on the veil of Isis, ‘I am that which was, is, and will be, and my veil no mortal hath lifted’, melts away before thought.   "Nature", Hamann therefore rightly says, "is a Hebrew word written only with consonants and the understanding must point it."

Now although the #empirical treatment of Hegel’s works has this category of universality in common with this commentary, the #empiricists are sometimes uncertain whether this universal is #subjective or #objective; one can often hear it said that these classes and orders are only made as aids to cognition.   This uncertainty is still more apparent in the search for distinguishing marks, not in the belief that they are essential, objective characteristics of things, but that they only serve our convenience to help us distinguish things.   If nothing more than that were involved, we might, e.g. take the lobe of the ear as the sign of being human, for no animal has it; but we feel at once that such a characteristic is not sufficient for a knowledge of human nature.   When, however, the universal is characterized by #law, #force, #matter, then we cannot allow that it counts only as an external form and a subjective addition; on the contrary, objective reality is attributed to #laws, #forces are immanent, and #matter is the true #nature of the thing itself.   Something similar may be conceded in regard to #genera too, namely that they are not just a grouping of similarities, an abstraction made by us, that they not only have common features but that they are the objects’ own inner nature ; the #orders not only serve to give us a general view, but form a graduated scale of Hegel’s works/system itself.   The distinguishing marks, too, should be the universal, substantial element of the #genus.   Analysis of Hegel’s works looks on these universals as its triumph: ...

The Systematic Commentary takes up the material (Hegel’s works) which scholars, compilers and translators have prepared for it #empirically, at the point to which they have brought it, and reconstitutes it, so that #experience is not its final warrant and base.   The scholars etc. must therefore work the material into the hands of philosophers, in order that the latter may translate into the Geist the abstract #univeral transmitted to it, by showing how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds from the Geist.   The philosophic way of treating the material is no mere whim, once in a way to walk on one’s head for a change, after having walked for a long while on one’s legs, or once in a way to see our everyday face bedaubed with paint: no, it is because of the method of the scholars, compilers etc. does not satisfy the Geist, that we have to go further.

What distinguishes the Systematic Commentary from a work of scholars, compilers etc. is, more precisely, the kind of system used; for the system is nothing else but the entire range of Hegelian concepts , and is, as it were, the diamond net into which everything is brought in order to make it intelligible.   Every discipline or systematic enquiry has its part to play in the system, its presuppositions, the absolute power within it of which it becomes master only when it makes its #metaphysics the object of its knowledge.   Philosophy in general has, as philosophy, other categories than those of the ordinary discussion: every systematic enquiry reduces to the distinction of categories.   All revolutions in the sciences originate solely from the fact that #Geist, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itself.
Now the inadequacy of the thought-determinations used in compilation, translation etc. can be traced to two points which are closely bound up with each other.
(a) The universal of scholar/compiler is abstract or only formal; its determination is not immanent in what is being done and it does not pass over into particularity.
(b) The determinate content falls for that very reason outside the universal; and so is split into fragments, into parts which are isolated and detached from each other, devoid of any necessary connection, and it is just this which stamps it as only finite.
If we examine a flower, for example, our understanding notes its particular qualities; chemistry dismembers and analyses it.   In this way, we separate colour, shape of the leaves, citric acid, etheric oil, carbon, hydrogen, etc.; and now we say that the plant consists of all these parts.

If you want to describe Hegel’s philosophy and gather its meaning,
To drive out its system must be your beginning,
Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one
The system that linked them, alas is gone
And ‘Commentary on Hegel’ is only a name
That the would-be describer bestows on't to hide his own shame.

[Stop the wriggling of what Nietzsche called worms by skewering them with a bait hook.]

Philosophy cannot remain at this stage of thinking in terms of detached, unrelated comments and there are two ways in which it can advance beyond it.
(a) The naive (alive and open) philosophy, when it vividly contemplates Hegel’s works, #feels the #life and the universal relatedness in Hegel’s works; it discerns that there is a theory of everything, and it also #feels in single #forms of philosophy (of the project) an intimate oneness with itself; but even if we put together all those ingredients of the flower the result is still not a flower.   And so, in commenting on Hegel, people have fallen back on #Anschauung (immediate immersion in his jargon) and set it above reflective thought; but this is a mistake, for one cannot philosophize out of #Anschauung.
(b) What is #intuited must also be #thought, the isolated parts must be brought back by #thought to simple universality; this #thought unity is the Geist, which contains the specific differences, but as an immanent self-moving unity.   The self-determinations of philosophic universality are not indifferent; it is the universality which fulfils itself, and which, in its diamantine identity, also contains difference.

The true #infinite is the #unity of itself and the #finite; and this, now is the #category of #philosophy and so, too, of this systematic commentary.   If #genera and #forces are the inner side of Hegel’s works, the universal, in face of which the outer and individual is only transient, then still a third stage is demanded, namely, the inner side of the inner side, and this, according to what has been said, would be the unity of the universal and the particular.

To Hegel’s philosophy there penetrates no mere limited commentary content only to display the outside of its rind.
The systematic commentary presupposes throughout the belief that ungrudgingly Hegel’s works offer their insights: his philosophy does not keep back its core, nor separate the rind, but always combines in each both rind and core.

In grasping this inner side, the one-sidedness of the disciple and consumer approaches is transcended, and at the same time each side receives its due.   The former contains a #universal without determinateness, the latter an #individuality without a #universal; the geist-like (geistlich, spiritual in Hegelian sense) explanation is the middle term in which #universality does not remain on this side, in me, over against the #individuality of the things: on the contrary, while it stands in a negative relation to things and assimilates them to itself, it equally finds individuality in them and does not encroach upon their independence, or interfere with their free self-determination.   The geist-like explanation is thus the unity of the disciple-oriented and consumer-oriented approaches: the #negation of #individuality is, as #negation of the #negative, the #affirmative #universality which gives permanence to its determinations; for the true #individuality is at the same time within itself a #universality.

As regards the objections which can be raised against this standpoint, the first question which can be asked is: How does the #universal determine itself?   How does the #infinite become #finite?   A more concrete form of the question is: How has the theory of everything come to explain everything?   The theory is, of course, conceived to be a #subject, a #self-subsistent #actuality far removed from what is explained in it; but such an #abstract #infinity, such a #universality which had the particular outside it, would itself be only one side of the relation, and therefore itself only a particular and #limited: it is characteristic of the #Verstand that it unwittingly nullifies the very determination it posits, and thus does the very opposite of what it intends.   The #particular is supposed to be separate from the #universal, but this very separateness, this independence, makes it a #universal, and so what is present is only the unity of the #universal and the #particular.   The theory reveals itself in two different ways: as philosophic work and as Philosophy.   Both manifestations are expressions of the theory which it fills, and in which it is present.   The theory, as an #abstraction, is not the true theory, but only as the speculative process of positing its Other, that which it is the explanation of, which, comprehended in its absolute form is its Exposition; and it is only in unity with its Other, in Philosophy, that the theory is #Subject.   This, now, is the specific character and goal of this systematic commentary, that Philosophy finds in Hegel’s works its own nature, i.e. the Geist (philosophy) of this systematic commentary, finds its counterpart in Hegel’s works.   The study of Hegel’s works is thus the liberation of Philosophy in them, for Philosophy is present in them in so far as it is in relation, not with an #Other, but with itself.   This is also the liberation of Hegel’s works; implicitly they are #Reason, but it is through Philosophy that #Reason as such first emerges from Hegel’s work into existence.   Philosophy has the certainty of finding its own words in Hegel’s works.   But is this certainty also truth?   Since the inner being of Hegel’s works is none other than the #universal (Philosophy), then in philosophizing about this inner being our philosophizing is at home with itself.   #Truth in its #subjective meaning is the agreement of the word with the thing: in its objective meaning, truth is the agreement of the thing with its own self, the correspondence of its reality with its Geist.
The #Ego in its nature is the Geist, which is equal to itself and pervades all things, and which, because it retains the #mastery over the #particular #differences, is the #universal which returns into itself.   This Geist is directly the true Absolute Geist, the theory of everything which alone is the $Organic.   Thus the theory alone is the #Truth, the infinite Project whose #body and #soul are joined in a single work.   The first question here is:   Why is writing the systematic commentary part of the Project?