The complex
world of politics is one which we would normally believe to be more of an art
than a science. The Kurds with their limited political experience find it an
awesome task to ry to fathom this world of possibilities, intrigues and power
games. Most of our politicians, if not all, have no idea as to how probability
theory can give us a measure of what is likely to happen in tight
multi-factorial situations preferring instead to play guessing games and offer
unrealistic and unsound scenarios of possibilities based on personal
preference, fear and prejudice. In the modern science and technology of
politics, possibilities may be represented by what are called Truth Tables.
These are used to clarify, solve complex problems or predict events based on
empirical assessments and past experiences. A truth table is, therefore,
simply a table of possible outcomes against two-way values of Yes and No or 1
and 0 against each logical entity comprising the outcome or function being
evaluated.
The
following is a Truth Table showing the various possibilities (s) concerning
the Iraq/Kurdistan possibilities and the occurrence of each of the events
represented by the column headings. For example: State 1 is the situation
where The Events of Column 2 or (A) and Column 6 or (E) will be True while
none of the others will be True. In other words The Function represented by
State 1 may be expressed in Terms of Boolean Algebra as follows:
State 1 = A AND E AND NOT(B OR C OR D OR F OR G)
State 2 = B AND E AND NOT(A OR C OR D OR F OR G)
…
State 10= C
AND D AND NOT(A OR B OR E OR F OR G)
|
State |
Iraq Remaining as it is
with Sanctions (A) |
Iraq Remaining as it is
with Sanctions Removed (B) |
Regime changed (C) |
Kurds Retaken (D) |
Kurds Remain as they are at present (E) |
Federal Kurdish in a
Changed Iraq (F) |
Kurdistan Becomes Independent (G) |
|
1 |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
|
2 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
|
3 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
4 |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
|
5 |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
|
6 |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
7 |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
8 |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
|
9 |
No |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
|
10 |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
Truth Table 1. The States
In Truth
Table 1 there are 10 States. Each State will have its own conditions and
factors which we will assess in table 2 below.
To help
demonstrate the influence of Nations and/or Groups on the occurrence of a
State, Truth Table 2 is shown below where the columns are headed with the
possible State of Affairs, the rows are marked with the names of the nations
or groups involved in the decision-making/influencing process which affect the
occurrence or otherwise of that State and the last row but one represents the
total points scored for each State, made up of the sum of the weighting
figures for each nation or group influencing positively the outcome to be
realised. A YES in a column
indicates that the nation or group adds the value to the sum of the weighting
in full to the likelihood of the realisation of that State, in the last row
but-one of the table. A Yes/No
entry has a value of only half the associated weighting and a NO
entry will add a weighting of zero.
Those
decision makers who are usually of similar inclination are colour coded and
the total points they muster are added up at the bottom of the table to
indicate their combined influence on the political arena.
For the
purposes of illustration only I have devised a system of weighting based on my
experience of how a particular nation or group of nations would react to the
Iraq/Kurdistan situation and the importance of the nation or group and its
influence on the decision-making process in world politics vis-à-vis Iraq and
the problems of the Middle East in general. The results of Truth Table 2,
demonstrate the likelihood of each State on that basis and indicate the most
likely ones to be States 5 and 10 respectively. These are:
· State 5: A Federal Kurdistan within a New Iraqi System or,
·
State 10: A New fully integrated Iraq with
Kurdistan taken back under the wing of the new Government
It must be
noted that Nations, Groups and Blocks do not necessarily share the same views
or inclinations vis-à-vis every situation in the world. Therefore, we must
re-populate these tables using different weightings for every different
political test.
What if we
wanted to see the likelihood of only the States which would indicate the
possibilities of a Federal or Independent Kurdistan? Those states are :
Kurdish
Gains = State 3 OR State 5 OR State 6 OR State 7.
Which
equals :
B AND G AND
NOT(A OR C OR D OR E OR F) OR C AND F AND NOT(A OR B OR D OR E OR G) OR C AND
G AND NOT(A OR B OR D OR E OR F) OR A AND G AND NOT(B OR C OR D OR E OR F)
Optimising
the above expression will produce a much shorter expression:
NOT(D+E).(NOT(A+B).C.(F*G)+NOT(E+F).G.(A*B))
Where “*” is the Exclusive OR operator, “.” Is the Logic AND, and “+” is the Logic OR. The Exclusive OR expression, A*B is equivalent to A.NOT(B) + B.NOT(
1 No Change in Iraq or Kurdistan
2 Sanctions removed and no Change in Iraq or Kurdistan
3 Sanctions removed and Kurdistan gains independence
4 Saddam overthrown but Kurdistan remains as it is
5 Saddam overthrown and Kurds becomes a Federal
6 Saddam overthrown and Kurdistan gains Independence
7 No Change in Iraq and Kurdistan gains Independence
8 No Change in Iraq but Saddam retakes Kurdistan
9 Sanctions removed and Saddam retakes Kurdistan
10
Saddam is removed and Kurdistan retaken by
new Government
|
|
Weighting |
State 1 |
State 2 |
State 3 |
State 4 |
State 5 |
State 6 |
State 7 |
State 8 |
State 9 |
State 10 |
|
The
Americans |
100 |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes/No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
The
British |
100 |
No |
No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
Iraqi
Opposition |
10 |
No |
No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
The
Arabs |
30 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes/No |
|
Iran |
10 |
No |
Yes/No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
|
Turkey |
50 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
Yes/No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Syria |
10 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
The
EEC |
100 |
No |
Yes/no |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
No |
No |
No |
|
The
Russians |
40 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Israel |
50 |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes/No |
No |
No |
Yes |
|
India |
20 |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
No |
No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
|
South
East Asia |
30 |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
|
South
America |
20 |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
|
The
Islamic World |
30 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
China |
30 |
No |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
African
Countries |
30 |
No |
Yes |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
|
Kurdish
Proplr’s National
Struggle. |
50 |
Yes/No |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
|
Performance
of Kurdish Leadership |
50 |
Yes/No |
Yes/no |
Yes/No |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
No |
No |
|
Total |
440 |
Western |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
100 |
Arab |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
60 |
Neutral |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
60 |
Special |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
100 |
Kurdish |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
760 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Value |
85 |
360 |
190 |
425 |
510 |
315 |
410 |
245 |
255 |
495 |
|
|
%tage |
11.6 |
47.4 |
26 |
58.22 |
67.1 |
43.15 |
53.94 |
32.23 |
33.55 |
65.13 |
Truth Table 2. The Conditions Relating to the
Outcomes
The
likelihood of the least likely outcome (State 1) of Truth Table 1, only adds up
to 85 points. This State predicts the preservation of the current status quo
without any changes at all.
However, the
truth values of YES or NO
are by no means rigid and may be varied and modified by political pressure and
campaigning, aimed at gathering the most points for a particular outcome
(State). Each nation or group, too, has its own facilities and methods to
influence the process of decision making. States 3, 6 and 7, for example, would
be ideal for the Kurds under favourable circumstances. However State 5 is
acceptable for the current state of affairs and the current assumed entries in
the Truth Table. Therefore we need to target specific nations, groups or blocks
to “persuade”
them as to the justice of our cause and enlist their support to achieve the best
outcomes we wish for.
Note that the
block of nations and groups marked red (non-Arab, non-Islamic and Western
nations), have a total score of 440 out of 760 or 57.9%.
They are followed by the Arab/Islamic block with 100 out of 760 or 13.15%.
The Kurds can also muster the same influence because of the past atrocities
committed by Saddam against them and the sympathy which they have managed to
acquire.
The other two
blocks are the Russians and the Indians with 15.78% between them.
The blocks
which carry the greatest weights are therefore the Western Block Among them we
see opportunities mainly with the Europeans, and Americans. However, they are
not lightly influenced by common interests with their Arab and Islamic friends.
Thus at present, we see a block which has a minor influence of only 13.15% of
the international community affecting a block which ahs an influence of nearly
60%.
The Arabs and
Islamic countries are highly unlikely to support any Kurdish claim to the Right
to Self-Determination. The Neutral Countries are however receptive of such ideas
and they too should be courted to provide moral and political support.
Furthermore, groups such as the African countries and those of South America
have their influence on the biggest Western groups too.
The logic
expression represented by the following,
NOT(D+E).(NOT(A+B).C.(F*G)+NOT(E+F).G.(A*B))
Shows very
clearly that the most important logic (States) require that: Iraq and Kurdistan
must Not be retaken by Iraq (D) and not remain as they are (E). Given that we
have two inclusive alternative States:
1 NOT(A+B) AND C AND Exclusive OR in F and G, or;
2
NOT(E+F) AND G AND Exclusive OR in A and B
Note: By
Inclusive Alternatives we mean two possible states which do not exclude each
other out while Exclusive Alternatives cannot co-exit together.
From Table 2
we see that the total points, actually scored by all ten States is 3290 out of a
possible 7600. This is so because the ten states we have depicted are only one
set of all possible occurrences. The points scored by the four States
representing possible Kurdish gain are:
190
510
315
410
1425
Which give us a likelihood of 1425/3290 or
%43.21.This is a reasonable one for
the assumptions and circumstances we have assumed, although a more than 50%
result would make gain more likely and feasible.
The linkage
between the Arab and Islamic world on the one hand and the Western one changes
from time to time. Weaknesses between them always increases the percentage for
Kurdish gain while the opposite is also true. That is quite clearly shown by the
Gulf war, the 11th. of September atrocities and the Israeli
Palestinian conflict.
The influence
of Turkey and Russia today is not as significant as it used to be although from
the practical point of view Turkey and Iran could present an obstacle if the
Western block insisted on taking them onboard at all times.
The Kurdish
political analysts should therefore consider getting support from those who are
not at present following in the footsteps of the big block or have a non-aligned
policy towards the region such. For example, although getting close to the Arabs
can be beneficial for some African states, there are nevertheless States which
are sympathetic to the Kurdish cause. Equally so is the situation with Latin
America. We must look for opportunities everywhere to increase the support for
Kurdish rights.
However, a
clear and unconfused message must be sent to those whose support we need and
seek. As an internal matter, we are very unlikely to get any support because
there is a well-known phobia associated with what is commonly termed “Internal
Affairs of other Member States”. Thus, we are cutting our own throats when we
constantly refer to the preservation of Iraq’s Sovereignty and Territorial
Integrity and declare our desire to remain Iraqis. Our enemies coach our leaders
into making utterances which are designed to shut the door on any possible help
or assistance we may be able to get. This stance will lose us all external
support, alienate all but those who are very keen to keep us subjugated and
oppressed or those who want justification to do nothing about our plight and
still claim to be our friends. What State or power block will entertain putting
our case in the agenda at the UN Security Council, knowing our leaders are
constantly rejecting the fact that we do have a genuine and Just Case?
There are
those who justify this suspect stance by claiming that:
This claim is
however fundamentally flawed. The reasons are:
Therefore,
the Leadership is exaggerating the dangers and are simply doing as they are told
without giving enough consideration to the facts of the matter. This article it
is hoped will demonstrate the great sacrifice which is being made for very
little gain if any.
The reason
the Palestinians are winning the struggle is precisely their clear and
unequivocal message. No one has any doubt about what they want and insist on and
that is why they are getting support even from inside Israel itself. Their war
against Israel is not the result of declaring their wish to exercise their right
to self determination but because of violent actions which both sides are
undertaking against each other. No one on the Kurdish side is suggesting suicide
bombers attacking Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus or Tehran. Therefore, it is highly
unlikely these Sates will send their tanks and planes to bomb the Kurds with
Western protection in place and the world watching every move.
And, therefore, as long as the Kurds declare their allegiance to Iraq no one is ready or willing to support such an unclear and hesitant cause just as no one will get on a train whose destination is unclear or unknown. The Kurdish leaders have still to realise this unbending principle as a result of which they are keeping the Kurds where they are and preventing the cause from evolving and developing along its natural pat