Europe provides one of the best "homes" for the illegal trading in firearms in the world. The geographical location of Europe actually helps with the modern day trading of illegal firearms. The closeness of Russia and other former Communist States, which is the home of a large selection of new and ex-military arsenals, and the remoteness of large flatlands in Eastern Europe (weaponry require large consignments), provides the traders with the means of supplying their close "neighbours", with relative ease (unnoticed). Often, the goods in question are traded amongst other known criminal organizations in each member state (Arms Network). These "arms dealer's" are then responsible for dealing/dispersing the goods to other criminal organizations in other parts of the country - today, a continuous link of trading often incorporates a vast selection of different groups / organizations. Therefore, the diffusion of weapons to all regions of the EU can be achieved within relative little time thanks to the vast transportation systems in place (the same systems are used for other illicit activities).

Europe had to wait for the most serious war to hit the Mediterranean region since 1945, to see the heel of Italy become the new geopolitical node of organized crime. Both for logistic reasons (the proximity to Yugoslavia) and because of the specific features of Apulia's own black economy (smuggling, control over local banks, interests in the marketing of farm product), the Sacra Corona Unita then succeeded in making the quantum leap to become a first-rate mafia. It now controls negotiations concerning strategic commodities (from cereals for the Maghreb countries to conventional weapons, from drugs to materials used in the development of nuclear systems of mass destruction, from money made by trafficking to money illegally invested by criminals and tax-evaders in the new financial centres of the Balkans). In hindsight, it could be said that war itself brings about the exceptional development of illicit markets.

The opening of borders in Europe has also allowed the Mafia to extend its interests to include weapon trafficking. In his report Mr Mancino added: "It's very easy in this period to find weapons in Croatia and in the other Republics of former Yugoslavia." "An operation by the Italian Investigative Directorate against Mafia, (the DIA) broke an illegal weapons' trafficking ring between former Yugoslavians and a group linked to a Mafia's family." Another lucrative Mafia interest is the trafficking of radioactive material. The soft frontiers of Eastern Europe let cesium, mercury and uranium pass and reach different countries where there are laboratories for the manufacture of nuclear weapons The nuclear weapons' traffic is very worrying. Plutonium and uranium are easily stolen from Eastern Europe laboratories, even though the amounts are too little for the nuclear weapons' building." (Alessandro Crocetta & Ubaldo Cordellini)

But war, much more than drugs, is responsible for raising the profile of the arms network beyond all expectations. In the early days of the crisis which was to turn into protracted bloodshed, Apulia (Italy) was already serving as the terminal of the arms circuit. Arms enter Italy from the Trieste border crossing and reach the region north of Bari and the Salento after long journeys by road. When the conflict in Slovenia came to an endand the guns in northern Croatia remained silent, the crossing became impossible since the Slovene government would not tolerate illicit traffics following its application for accession to the European Union. Thus, the arms circuits have rapidly come to coincide with those used by cigarette smugglers and the principal nodes have moved to Montenegro and Albania. Movements of illicit goods are not hindered by the embargo in force which, while prohibiting exports to former Yugoslavia, has failed to introduce any serious measure to stop goods from leaving those territories.

Recently, there have been signs that the network of big dealers in nuclear weapons which was exposed in 1987 with the impounding in the port of Bari of the Lebanese vessel "Boustany I" is still inexistence. The episode confirmed the importance of the Adriatic sea and the Apulian ports for the supply of weapons and ammunition to Iran and Iraq which had been fighting for eight years. Soon afterwards came the terrible confirmation in the form of the discovery in a villa in Squinzano, on the coast near Brindisi, of the headquarters of an organization acting as brokers of entire weapon systems: ballistic missiles, submarines, fighter planes, even nuclear weapons. And here the pattern of trafficking displays a new feature in that the same network handles guns, tanks and bombs, but is also pursuing a large-scale project to store industrial waste, including nuclear waste, in African countries. It becomes apparent that the illegal arms trade network has diversified its activities: it manages three-way deals covering a large range of prohibited high-risk goods such as toxic industrial waste. The war in Yugoslavia reactivated the circuits of illicit trade in arms which had been established during the Iran-Iraq conflict and had since fallen into disuse, particularly after the Gulf War. Thus, in the geopolitical framework of large-scale trafficking, Italy's Apulia's coast and hinterland have grown in importance (Fondazione Rosselli : European Commission Forward Studies Unit -Organized Criminality Security in Europe, Working Paper, 1999).

To form an idea of the income generated by the brokerage of illicit sales of arms and the scale of the interests involved, it might be useful to look at the fees legally received by international salesmen clinching deals during peacetime. Commissions paid are declared and therefore authorized when the authorities approve the procurement and the movement of the goods. They used to be mentioned in the papers of the "Advisory committee on brokerage fees", which was still functioning in the 80s and was attached to the Italina Ministry for Foreign Trade. The committee gave the necessary endorsement to the official representatives of the parties involved in the sale of arms and armament. In the 80s, when war was a distant problem for Europe, both east and west, commissions ranged between 5% (rarely) and 15%. (Fondazione Rosselli : European Commission Forward Studies Unit -Organized Criminality Security in Europe, Working Paper, 1999) Organized Criminality and Security in Europe For the supply to Malaysia of four minesweepers built by the company Intermarine - worth LIT 180 billion - LIT 23.5 billion was paid in commissions to a Singapore account. The beneficiary was Djiatra Soln Bhd, Kuala Lumpur. When the company Oto Melara sold 200 armoured battle vehicles, complete with weapons and accessories, to Saudi Arabia - worth USD 300 million - -a certain Reem Est du Vaduz and Mitsa Ltd, Jersey, received USD 31.5 million. The day Selenia sold 16 Aspide missiles to Greece, Albert S. Modiano (Greece) pocketed USD 233 000 on a deal worth USD 4.5 billion, i.e. 5%. But Cbf Financial Service Ltd (Canada) demanded Agusta 10% on the sale of helicopters to Egypt: USD 2.5 million on the USD 25 million deal" (Mino Fucillo, Tangente? Mettiamoci un timbro, in "La Repubblica",2nd December 1986).

European Criminal organizations are now in touch with powerful foreign criminal groupings, some of which (in Colombia, for example) run full-scale armies which means they purchase arms as much out of emulation as out of operational needs; more importantly, links are being established with foreign Mafia-type organizations (in Russia and the former Yugoslavia, for example) which, because of the relaxation in arms controls, or infiltration from or cooperation with the armed forces, have access to highly sophisticated armaments which can be made available to criminal groups in other countries via international transactions (e.g. drugs for arms).

The traffic of strategic materials and radioactive substances has experienced a big proliferation, due to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the simultaneous cancellation of the control mechanisms in some fields of activity. In their search for buyers of such goods en route to Germany, the USA or to some Islamic countries, such as Iran and Lybia, Russian criminal organizations asked for the support of the Rumanians. (Ernesto U. Savona and Sabrina Adamoli : The Impact Of Organized Crime in Central and Eastern Europe, Transcrime, 1996). In Europe considerable alarm has been raised by nuclear materials trafficked by countries belonging to the former Soviet Union. Although it is almost clear that for the moment, rather than criminal organizations, the traffickers are greedy freelancers, traders, adventurers or opportunists (R. Atkinson, "Official Say Contraband Not a Threat", in The Washington Post, August 28, 1994). looking for a demand in the area. It is likely that in the future, criminal organizations will enter this market for extortion purposes. If purchasers cannot be found and the material is on hand, then extortion may appear particularly attractive. There are currently several hundred tons of weapon-usable fissile material under inadequate physical security and material control in Russia. Kilogram quantities of weapon-usable fissile materials have been stolen from institutes in Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Part of this material is not intercepted before leaving the Russian borders (Ernesto U. Savona : Recent trends of Organized crime in Europe; Actors, Activities and policies against them, Transcrime, 1998).

Trafficking in nuclear materials is also taking place between Russia, Switzerland, Italy and the Arab countries.As regards trafficking in Russian arms, whether ordinary or military weapons, most of the material comes from thefts from ex-Soviet army barracks which have fallen into the hands of various nationalist movements whose activities are not easy to monitor. Russian arms have also been seized from Italian criminal organizations: for example, on 20 February 1993, the police intercepted a consignment of Russian arms in Milan - the arms came from Croatia and were intended for the Calabrian 'ndrangheta; in July 1993, in the province of Salerno, two camorra vehicles were intercepted with four Russian anti-tank bazookas on board; again in 1993, in theprovince of Lecce, explosives, detonators, anti-personnel bombs and anti-tank weapons, machine guns and ammunition were seized in four separate operations - all the material was of ex-Soviet origin. Russia is the only example of a nuclear power where a high rate of criminal activity is combined with political and economic instability. (Fondazione Rosselli : European Commission Forward Studies Unit -Organized Criminality Security in Europe, Working Paper, 1999)

The alarming growth in illegal arms sales across Europe has worried all member states. According to the EU authorities, this growth has created the potential for civil unrest in many European regions and it is paramount that the scope of the trade is tackled with utmost importance. The link between criminal organizations and stores of heavy firepower, has meant that the likelihood of mass bloodshed is evermore. With increasing rivalry between the leading criminal groups, combined with the inter-religion wars (Europe is home for a number of different religions, parties , organizations etc..), the arms trade in Europe is likely to prosper further and booster the profits of the illegal operatives. Because of the threat to national security in many states, the European Union has committed vast amounts of resources to Europe and member state authorities, to police the illegal trafficking of non registered firearms.

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