Author: U Shwe
Zan Aung, D. Litt., (1871- 1932)
The Translator of 'The Compendium of Philosophy'
Copyright - Myanmar Book Centre & Book Promotion & Service Ltd., Bangkok, Thailand
Restriction: For your own private non-business study only and not to be re-published nor re-distributed.
Persons of the Dialogue: Agga, Sumana, Teja and Tissa
The scene is laid in the Nandavanta laura in the Sagaing hills.
Sumana. Good evening, Sir. How is Your Reverence keeping?
Agga. I am four score years old to-day, but I feel quite strong for my age. I thank you much for your very kind enquiry. May I know who you are?
Sumana. I am Sumana, a pupil of Dr. Ledi. Your longevity is the result of the purity of your silas.
Agga. Is your master hale and hearty.
Sumana. He, too, is advancing in years and is slightly infirm with age. But, though the flesh is weak, his spirit is as strong as ever.
Agga. He is comparatively young and it is my earnest hope that he will soon be restored to perfect health and be spared many more years to come so that he may be able to continue, with renewed vigour, the good work he has already done in the way of propagation of our religion. But will you tell me the object of your visit at this late hour in the after noon, for you stem rather intent upon something?
Sumana. I have come here on purpose and I have brought a friend of mine with me.
Agga. You are welcome to my cloister. I have made this little retreat my abode since my master's death at Mingun as it was very suit able for meditation. There were very few hermitages then, but a great many have sprung up, like mushrooms, since. What is your companion's name?
Sumana. He is Tissa, a pupil of the late Dr. Myobyingyi.
Agga. I extend the hospitality of this my humble roof to you also, Tissa. Your master made the Compendium of Philosophy his speciality and, if I am not mistaken, he is followed by the majority of students of Buddhism in Burma. Is it not?
Tissa. I should think so, Sir.
Agga. Sumana, you have as yet to specify the nature of your business.
Sumana. Sir, we have sought you here because, in all accounts we have heard of you, you are represented as the only disciple of Dr. Shwegyin, who still holds the antiquated view that Nibbana is something in the nature of a mental or spiritual. Perhaps we are disturbing your solitude. Are we interrupting your thoughts?
Agga. My thoughts flow as easily in conversation as when I am alone. I take your observations on my waster's view in good spirit. He spent practically a life-time over the question of Nibbana and the results of his labours in this field are embodied in a great work entitled the Mahanibbuta-nibbuta. His is a view hallowed by antiquity and I adhere to it.
Sumana. But, Sir, was it not a fact that Dr. Ingan, the late head of your sect, who was himself the disciple of your own master, had expressed his opinion that Ledi's news are sounder?
Agga. Yes. Ingan was a fine scholar. But it does not follow that he was cleverer than his master.
Sumana. Ledi's view that Nibbana is nothing but calm, tranquillity or peace (santi) has been accepted throughout the length and breadth of Burma.
Agga. Sumana, I am not alone in my persuasion that Nibbana is something more than mere calm (santi-matta). I have up here a friend of mine from Henzada. His name is Teja. His master, U Ukkamsamala., the late famous Doctor of Okpo, held that Nibbana is unique mind and body. Is it not, Teja?
Teja. Yes, Sir.
Agga. The annihilationistic school, however, teaches in effect that Nibbana is pure nothing.
Sumana. But this view of annihilation has been exploded by Buddhist writers. E.g., Sumangalasami, the well-known author of the famous Tikagyaw, distinctly says that Nibbana is not annihilation (tuccha or abbava)
Agga. Quite so. But the fact that every writer has had to insist on Nibbana being something shows, does it not, that this erroneous view has been held by many.
Even Ariyavamsa of Sagaing, the author of the Manisaramanjusa, a deep student, and an able exponent, of the Tikagyaw, as late as the 15th Century, seems to have leaned, in his Manidipa, to the annihilationistic view when he said that we should not use the expression 'Nibbana is attained' because there are still khandhas in the Sa-upadisesa Nibbana and because there is nothing left in the Anupadisesa to be attained. According to him the attainment of Nibbana consists in having Nibbana merely as an object of path and fruitional consciousnesses.
The common sense school holds the extreme opposite view that Nibbana is a paradise.
These two schools claim the ignorant majority.
Sumana. It is no good referring to the views of the ignorant.
Agga. Well, Sumana, I have brought this matter up at the outset with a double purpose: -
Teja (interposed.) We all are agreed that Nibbana is something, though we differ as to the nature of that.
Agga. Yes. Burma, I mean the Burmese Buddhist world of philosophy, is divided into three camps, so to speak. There is the Shwegyin school which holds that Nibbana is spiritual mind, while the Okpo school advances the view that it is unique mind and body. The Ledi school, however, teaches that it is neither mind nor body but purely calm.
Now, before deciding which of these three views is correct, a few preliminary questions shall have to be gone into. Our philosophers bring four categories, to wit, mind, mental properties, matter and Nibbana, under a more general concept of reality (paramattha). And Nibbana is a reality of realities.
Sumana. Undoubtedly.
Agga. Then, it is essential that we should first of all clearly understand what is meant by reality. Do you agree?
Sumana. Certainly.
Agga. Pray, tell me, Sumana, what you understand by the term 'real.'
Sumana. I would define the real as that which is existent. This is in accordance with Buddhaghosa's explanation of the term in his commentary on the Kathavatthu in the sense of manifestation (bhutattho).
Agga. The word existent is rather ambiguous. Does it include that which has existed, that which exists and that which will exist?
Sumana. Yes, it does.
Agga. Do you, then, mean that which has existed in the past is still real?
Sumana. I should think so, for I can vividly imagine yesterday's fire to be existent.
Agga. Here you have confounded an image with a reality of which it is but a representation. The latter exists independent of your mind but the former does not. The image is a symbol of one individual object depicted to mind's eye (uggaha-nimitta). What is called the after-image patipbhaga-nimitta) in the language of meditation is a concept, being the symbol of many objects. Both symbols, however, are mere signs (nimitta-pannatti) because they exist only in our minds like hare's horns or tortoise' hairs.
Sumana. I own it. Rut the two fires are alike in their characteristics of heating or burning.
Agga. Does yesterday's fire burn any one to-day?
Sumana. Nay, it does not.
Agga. The reason is that you are not comparing the two actual fires of equal intensity of to-day.
Sumana. I am comparing my idea of yesterday's fire with the actual fire of to-day.
Agga. You cannot compare two disparate things, e.g., an idea with a reality; you have merely compared your idea of yesterday's fire with your idea of to-day's fire.
Tissa (interposed). But, Sir, is not a fire always fire by reason of its characteristics of burning?
Agga. Nay, that which no longer burns is not a fire at all.
Tissa. I mean that both yesterday's fire and to-day's fire are characterized by identical qualities of heating (teja).
Agga. This is only bringing individuals under a general, class concept. You may define the universal term fire as that which burns and then show that every individual fire comes within your definition. Logical definition is a legitimate mode of mental procedure.
Tissa. For this reason I say that fire is a reality because it never gives up its characteristics of burning.
Agga. The real fire burns but the concept fire does not. In omitting to make the distinction between a reality and a concept, I am afraid, Tissa, that you lean to the views of the Sabbathivadins.
Tissa. Pray, what are the views of this sect?
Agga. They hold that all past, present and future things exist because they do not give up the characteristics of khandhas (aggregates) If their views be correct, every concept would be real like Plato's Ideas. I take it for granted that every student of philosophy understands what I mean by Plato's ideas.
Tissa. Yes. Plato is a niccavadin who believes in the reality of his eternal and perfect ideas.
Agga. Space is an eternal idea of containing things. It always retains this feature. But you would not say that it is real for that reason. Again, time is always time and is never converted into space, but it is no more real than space is. Similarly with all other concepts. In fact, Platonic realism, which is really idealism or conceptualism or nominalism had been very ably refuted by the Elder Moggliputta Tissa. If you need the details of his argument, I must refer you to the Sabbamatthivada Katha in the Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy).
According to the orthodox view, the real is ever confined to the present. Yesterday's fire was real only while it was burning; and to morrow's fire will be real when it comes into being but not otherwise. In other words, the past fire which has burnt itself out is no longer real and the future fire which will burn is not yet real. Both the past and future things are at present but mere concepts, notions, ideas, mental views or aspects. I suppose you agree to this. Do you not?
Tissa. Yes, I do.
Agga. Then, Sumana will have to amend his definition of the real. Instead of defining it as that which is existent, it would be more accurate to define it as that which is existing.
Sumana. I have no objection to the proposed amendment. I acknowledge that the real is explained by a synonymous term vijjamana which is generally rendered into Burmese by" existing".
Agga. Yes. This useful word is formed from root vid—' to know', the passive suffix ya and the present participial ending mana. It literally means 'being known' at the present moment. To be known is to be evident and to he evident is to manifest. But a thing cannot manifest itself without a real being. Its intensive form samvijjamana has been intentionally adopted to emphasise the fact that neither the past nor the future thing is real but that the real is confined to the present only. So far we all are agreed that one condition of reality is that it must be existing.
Tissa. Granted.
Agga. But our idea of reality is not yet complete. For eternalists may understand the term 'existing' as existing for ever without a change. The other test of reality is, therefore, that it is in a continual flux, while concepts are constant.
Tissa. Is it not the other way about? Silver, when manufactured into different articles receives several names of cup, bowl, plate and so on in turn while the metal silver remains the same. In this illustration the metal silver corresponds to the reality while the names 'cup', 'bowl', etc., are mere concepts. Hence concepts change from 'cup' to 'bowl' and from 'bowl' to 'plate', but the metal remains unchanged.
Agga. Even the name silver, nay, the name metal itself, is but a concept. But I will not mince matters. I understand you to wean the ultimate constituents of matter when you say silver or metal. But when you say ' cup ', 'bowl'. etc., I shall understand you to confine yourself to the names only.
Tissa. Yes, that is exactly what I mean.
Agga. Now, to regard the ultimate constituents or contents of a piece of metal called silver as constant is heresy due to hallucinations of perception, view or judgement; for, did not the Buddha say that all things in the making are in a state of flux?
There is also a fallacy in your argument that concept 'cup' changes to concept 'bowl' which in turn changes to 'plate'. A concept, once formed, is never lost. It becomes a universal term held in reserve for application to similar individual objects at any future time. This fallacy has been well exploded in the Kathavatthu. Speaking of a certain white cloth which, say, is turned black, the heterodox opponent asked: Is the whiteness given up? The orthodox adherent answered it in the affirmative because white colour as a reality had been replaced by another reality, black colour. But when the question was: Is the clothness given up?, the orthodox answer was in the negative because "clothness" is a mere concept arising from a combination of single threads.
Tissa. I acknowledge that it is so.
Agga. Then, do you agree that for anything to be real the following two conditions must be satisfied?
(a) That it must be existing; and
(b) That it must be in a flow.
Tissa.. Yes, I do.
Agga. In that case, reality may be defined as an existing condition of flux. Therefore, mind, mental properties, matter and Nibbana, if allowed a real being, must satisfy the above definition. I mean that even Nibbana forms no exception. Otherwise it would not be real. You should be able to distinguish what I may call book-mind and lip-Nibbana from real ones. The book-mind and the lip-Nibbana are mere concepts which do not exist except in our minds and therefore do not have an independent flowing existence, actual change being the essential mark of distinction between a reality and a concept.
Sumana (interposed). But a sole reservation or exception has to be made in favour of Nibbana which is permanent. abiding and enduring.
Agga. You are a dualist. That is to say, you start with an assumption that there are two radically different kinds of realities, conditioned and unconditioned.
Sumana. I beg your pardon, Sir. Mine is not an assumption at all. I have based my views on the clear dictum of the Buddha. He said in the Anguttara Nikaya that 'there are two elements, conditioned and unconditioned. The marks of conditioned are three. Which three? Genesis is apparent; dissolution is apparent; a state of duration other than genesis and dissolution is also apparent. Similarly, the three marks of unconditioned are: genesis, dissolution and duration are not apparent.'
Agga. You seem to think that these marks stick to things like the outlines of an object. Yet they, like the outlines of an object, are mere. appearances to the mind. The word 'apparent' is the crux of this passage. The Pali word is pannayati from prefix pa, which is explained by pakarena—' in different aspects', and root na, 'to know'. It is quite legitimate for a monist to look upon the real as One, even as the truth is One, and to regard the Buddha as having spoken of it by the dual method from two view-points. To intellect from without the real appears in three different aspects. But to intuition from within these aspects disappear (na-pannayati). What is relative and conditioned to intellect becomes absolute and unconditioned to intuition. Our intellect divides the stationary track left behind the flowing reality and divides the immobile time passed over by it into a 'powder of moments' which we name nascent or genetic, static or durative and cessant or arrested. But intuition which follows the continuous flow from within the simple, indivisible reality dispenses with these time concepts. Consider a wave motion. You think that each wave is succeeded by another after under going the threefold process of beginning, lasting and subsiding. But what is it that moves on and on? Physicists will say force or energy. Now, if this force or energy be endowed with consciousness, if would feel itself as onward motion at every moment without interruption. It would not feel itself as now beginning, next fasting and then subsiding. An outside observer draws an imaginary line of break between the subsidence of a previous phase and the rising of a succeeding one and in doing so, he practically considers motion between any two such breaks as rest. In your view intellect and intuition are assumed not to differ in kind but in degrees but conditioned and unconditioned are held as radically different, whereas in my view intellect and intuition are held to be radically different as poles asunder but conditioned and unconditioned are treated as two different aspects of one reality.
Is it not, Sumana?
Sumana. Yes, Sir.
Agga. It is not an easy matter to decide which of these two views is correct, before we have a clear idea of what Nibbana is. But so far we have cleared our way for discussion on Nibbana. Now, Sumana, after all we have said on the distinction between a reality and a concept, do you still maintain that Nibbana is nothing but calm.?
Sumana. I do.
Agga. Pray, analyse your idea of calm.
Sumana. By calm I mean freedom from trouble or evil.
Agga. Then, calm is synonymous with the extinction of Ill. But if you go a step further in your analysis, you will find that this Ill is reduced to suffering or pain caused by desire. Therefore, your calm is the extinction of the fires of this desire.
Sumana. I own it, since Sariputta himself described Nibbana as extinction of corruptions.
Agga. I suppose you refer to the Zambukhadaka Sutta where the Arahant described Nibbana as extinction of lust, ill-will and ignorance.
Sumana. Yes, that is my authority.
Agga. Very well. If you read a little further on, you will find that Sariputta who lived face to face, i.e., in direct contact, with Nibbana described arahantship in identical terms. How now? Are the Nibbana and the Arahantship the same or different?
Sumana. Whether the same or different, Sir, what is the use of your splitting hairs in this matter?
Agga. But is it not good to know their identity or difference, Sumana?
Sumana. Well, Sir—the view of the vitandavadins is that arahant ship is so described because it comes into being after the extinction of corruptions. The consensus of opinion among the commentators, however, is that Nibbana is so described because corruptions are extinguished by it.
Agga. Which of these two views do you prefer? Sumana. Certainly the latter, Agga. The vitandavadins say that the arahantship is the result of the extinction of corruptions in the Path-moment, while the commentators refer to the Nibbana of the Path as the cause of the extinction of corruptions in arahantship; But what of the Nibbana of arahantship?
Sumana. I am rather perplexed over this question of yours.
Agga. Well, I must refer you to your own authority. Sariputta described this Nibbana as extinction of corruptions. But he also described arahantship in identical terms. Now, when a sane person describes two things in identical terms, must we not assume that the two things are really one and the same?
Sumana. Nay, that cannot be. When I describe an ass and a horse as animals I do not necessarily mean that the ass is the same as the horse.
Agga. Of course not. In your example you are simply bringing two different individuals tinder a higher concept. But you will not admit that extinction of corruptions is a higher concept than Nibbana.
Sumana. Assuredly not.
Agga. Sariputta first described Nibbana as extinction of corruptions. But Budhaghosa1 clearly said that, lest this description should mislead any one to regard it as mere extinction, Sariputta again described the arahantship in the very same terms. It is, therefore, plain that he intended to show that the Nibbana he described was not a lip-Nibbana but a concrete real as distinguished from an abstraction. Hence the expression, to wit, 'extinction of lust', ' extinction of ill-will', and 'extinction of nescience,' are but synonyms of the real Nibbana. I mean they merely denote the three different aspects of one and the same reality.
Sumana. I am not quite convinced.
Agga. Now, does the expression, 'extinction of lust' include the extinction of ill-will and of ignorance, or does the expression 'extinction of ill-will' include the extinction of lust and ignorance, or does the expression 'extinction of ignorance' include the other two?
Sumana. Decidedly not.
Agga. Then, in your view, there would be a multiplicity of Nibbanas, whereas Nibbana is an indivisible whole.
Sumana. But are there not a plurality of Nibbanas? There are four degrees of ariyanship. And since we are taught that a lower grade Ariyan does not know things of the higher grades, it follows that his Nibbana is different from those of the higher.
Agga. I do not deny the plurality of Nibbanas for different individuals, aye, even for each individual at different times. What I do deny is the plurality of them for each individual at any one time.
Sumana. Then is not the extinction of lust Nibbana?
Agga. Dhammapala says that mere extinction is not Nibbana.2 If mere extinction of lust be Nibbana, even lower animals would have to be considered as having attained Nibbana on the subsidence of their sexual desire. Surely your Nibbana is too crude to be described.
Sumana. (curtly) I am not so vile as to identify Nibbana with the temporary absence of lust in lower animals. I meant the eradication, extirpation, extermination or extinction of lust.
Agga. Softly, good Sumana. Be not angry with me for having put to you what Buddhaghosa himself as in the Sammohavinodani, his commentary on the Vibhanga, would have asked his opponent worthy of his own steel. Philosophical discussion should not be a heated controversy, but it should be carried on in a cool and calm atmosphere.
1. Yo kho avuso ragakkhayo 'ti adivacanato khayo nibbananti cc, na arahantassapi khayamattiapajjanato; tam pi hi yo kho avuso ragakkhayo' ti adinayena nidittham. The Visuddhimagga.
2. Khayamattam na Nibbanam. Saccasamkkeba.
To be continued
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